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ESSAY 
EN BANC REVISITED 
Michael Abramowicz* 
Legal commentatars have proposed a variety of solutions to the perceived 
prob/,ems of the U.S. courts of appeals, from splitting large circuits to assur-
ing partisan balance in panel decisions. They have always assumed, how-
ever, that judges from a particular appellate court should have so/,e responsi-
bility far creating the law of that circuit, except when caseload pressures make 
it necessary to barrow visiting judges. In this Essay, Professar Abramowicz. 
proposes using visiting judges in a mare important ro/,e: en bane decision-
making. Under this proposal, en bane decisions far one circuit would be 
made entirely by courts of appeals judges randomly sekcted from other cir-
cuits. In addition to increasing the likelihood that any given decision is 
mare likely to be that which a majority of all courts of appeals judges would 
make, visiting en bane panels would allow far optimization of the number of 
judges participating in en bane and far generalist review of specialized 
courts. After assessing these benefits and some possib/,e costs of the 
Prof essar Abramowicz. advances a mare general case far majoritarian judicial 
decision making. 
INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have long debated whether law is just politics by an-
other name. 1 Legal scholars, however, have done little to consider the 
debate's implications. If Benjamin Cardozo was correct in proclaiming 
that judicial lawmaking is "one of the existing realities of life,"2 then is 
* Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; 
B.A., Amherst College. For helpful comments and ideas, I would like to thank Sarah 
Abramowicz, Christopher Bracey, Shari Diamond, Kari Hong, Aziz Huq, Craig Lerner, 
Kimberly Moore, and Todd Zywicki. 
1. The controversy is perhaps best exemplified by the Hart-Fuller debate about 
whether law and morality are and can be separate. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 612-15 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 631-32 
(1958). The debate on the desirability and possibility of separating law and politics 
remains lively. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 2 (1990) ("Those who 
would politicize the law offer the public, and the judiciary, the temptation of results 
without regard to democratic legitimacy."); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law, 1780-1860, at 254-56 (1977) (identifying "[t]he desire to separate law and 
politics" as "a central aspiration of the American legal profession" and maintaining that 
this ideal is unattainable); Christina Gleason, Law and Politics Theory and Judicial 
Interpretation of Legislative Intent: Looking at Deference Through a Critical Lens in Ab/,e 
v. United States, 21 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 1, 2 (1999) (arguing "that law and politics are 
inherently intertwined realms that cannot and should not be segregated for fear of the 
manifest injustice that results"). 
2. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 10 (1921). 
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our existing adjudicative process adequate to this part of the judicial task? 
Christopher Peters has taken a first step toward answering this question, 
arguing that judicial lawmaking is not inherently undemocratic, particu-
larly if it proceeds in the case-by-case fashion associated with the common 
law.3 His inquiry, however, is concerned with the legitimacy of judicial 
lawmaking, rather than with how the judiciary itself should be struc-
tured. 4 The structure of legislative decisionmaking receives great atten-
tion, but legal commentators rarely consider how judicial structure might 
affect the quality of decisionmaking.5 
In this Essay, I aim to initiate such a discussion by evaluating a con-
crete problem that scholars have examined: structural reform of the U.S. 
courts of appeals. 6 I will refocus the existing dialogue, however, by worry-
ing about how courts should be structured given the assumption that ju-
dicial decisions, whether or not they are ever properly labeled "political," 
are indeed genuine decisions. Sometimes decisions are among compet-
ing, incommensurate values, 7 while at other times decisions may depend 
on difficult estimates in the face of vast empirical uncertainty.8 Regard-
less, if it is possible to speak of a particular decision as "correct" or "incor-
3. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 312, 
320 (1997). 
4. Central to Peters's claim of democratic legitimacy is that litigants are bound only by 
decisions that are reached in processes in which individuals with interests aligned with 
theirs participated, a type of representation that he calls "interest representation." Id. at 
347. For Peters, actual or virtual participation in the judicial decisionmaking process is 
adequate, even if the representatives have no role in actually making the decision binding 
the subsequent parties. Peters may be right that litigant participation meaningfully frames 
judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., id. at 353 (conceding that the judge plays a role in 
litigation, but stating that "it is far from the autonomous, dictatorial one that it is so often 
assumed to be"). Nonetheless, the actual decision, given the evidence and arguments 
presented, is a judicial one, particularly in appellate courts. Unlike Peters, I am concerned 
with ensuring that the decisionmakers are themselves representative. 
5. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, for example, have modeled the bicameral 
structure of Congress, arguing that this structure "push[es] policy away from extreme 
preferences." William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 
Geo. LJ. 523, 532 (1992). Yet there is little scholarship evaluating whether the structure of 
the judiciary has a similar effect. But cf. ToddJ. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model 
of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and 
Legislative Solutions to Large-Number Externality Problems, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 961, 
1002-03 (1996) (suggesting that the common law may be more efficient than legislatures 
at solving certain problems because it effectively requires unanimity). 
6. For discussion of scholars' approaches, see infra Part I. 
7. That choices may be among incommensurate values does not mean that any 
decision will do. See, e.g., Cass R Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
Mich. L. Rev. 779, 780 (1994) (clarifying that claims of incommensurability "are 
emphatically not meant to deny the existence of grounds for evaluating private and public 
choices"). 
8. These may not be distinguishable situations, as the phenomenon of 
incommensurability may simply be an informational problem. See Leo Katz, 
Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1465, 
1466-68 (1998). 
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rect," the structure of the judiciary plausibly might affect which label ap-
plies to a particular decision and how many "correct" and "incorrect" 
decisions are produced. 
Of course, I cannot in this space develop a comprehensive substan-
tive theory of what makes a decision "correct" or "incorrect."9 But I can 
offer a suitable working definition. Just as we structure legislatures 
around majoritarian principles, so too, I will argue, should we seek to 
ensure that when a panel reaches a decision, it is the decision that a ma-
jority of all judges on the courts of appeals would reach if given adequate 
time to consider the issue. 10 A decision is thus "correct" if it is the hypo-
thetical majoritarian one. Just because judges balance different consider-
ations from legislators, considering values such as stare decisis and choos-
ing among approaches to interpretation, does not mean that 
majoritarianism is less important in the judicial sphere. Yet it is not a 
goal that the legal academy has embraced, let alone one that scholars 
have debated how to achieve. 
I hope to remedy at least this scholarly neglect by proposing a simple 
institutional mechanism that would lead to more "correct" decisions in 
the sense of my working, majoritarian definition: When a circuit sits en 
bane, the members of the court should not be judges of that circuit, but a 
sample of judges from other circuits.11 For example, two or three times a 
year, a group of appellate judges from outside the Second Circuit would 
consider petitions for en bane rehearing of decisions by panels within the 
circuit. After selecting which cases to hear, the judges would meet, pre-
sumably in New York, and the visiting en bane court's decisions would be 
binding on the Second Circuit in the same way as a Second Circuit en 
bane decision ordinarily would be. 
9. For an attempt at such a theory, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986). But 
see Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with 
lntratextualism, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 730, 730-31 (2000) ("The unavoidable impression left 
by Dworkin's account was that it would take a judge like Hercules to wrest coherence from 
the chaotic mass of modem law. And the obvious criticism of Dworkin was that Hercules, 
of course, does not exist."). 
10. See infra Part III.A. I address only binary decisions, recognizing the potential 
problems with assuming that a "plurality" decision is the best one, given the pathologies of 
public choice. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. 
L. Rev. 802 (1982), reprinted in Maxwell L. Steams, Public Choice and Public Law 418, 427 
(1997) (providing an overview of the applicability of public choice to legal theory). 
11. Judge Wallace's proposal for a "national en bane court" at first seems similar to 
mine. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution 
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 913, 936-37 (1983). As in my 
proposal, such a court would consist of a sample of judges from the various courts of 
appeals. There are two key differences, however. First, Wallace's court would be convened 
only to decide an actual intercircuit conflict upon vote of the Supreme Court or a majority 
of the circuits, a cumbersome procedure. Second, a decision of this court would be 
binding precedent on all circuits, not just the circuit in which the case originated. This 
proposal may well be superior to the alternative of a National Court of Appeals. See infra 
Part I.A.2. But it would not provide routinely for the possibility of outside review of panel 
decisions. 
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There are three principal considerations underlying this proposal. 
The first two are that visiting en bane panels will be more representative 
of the totality of appellate judges than regional ones and that outside 
review is likely to be less susceptible to extraneous considerations than 
internal review. The third, and most surprising and significant, is that 
judges might make better decisions when the identities of those who will 
review the decisions are unknown. My proposal will provide incentives to 
craft opinions that appeal to judges in general rather than to a particular 
group of judges who may be quite different from the broader group. 
I will develop the argument as follows. Part I considers alternative 
approaches to solving the perceived problems of the courts of appeals. In 
Part II, I present the proposal for visiting en bane panels, elaborating the 
above discussion, describing some additional benefits of the proposal, 
and suggesting some ways that the proposal might be extended. Finally, 
Part III defends explicitly the normative premise underlying the propo-
sal. While the analysis in Part I hints toward the conclusion that 
majoritarian decisionmaking is desirable, and Part II accepts this and as-
sumes that this is a goal, Part III presents a simple case for the proposi-
tion that we should seek to structure the courts of appeals to ensure that 
cases are decided as the majority would decide them. It also counters 
arguments that diversity in decisionmaking might have significant 
benefits. 
I. PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
The U.S. courts of appeals in recent years have been the target of two 
seemingly very different criticisms. The first criticism is that the courts of 
appeals have been unable to cope with an ever-increasing caseload.12 
Congress has responded by providing for more judgeships, 13 but the 
12. See, e.g., Hon. Roger J. Miner, Book Review, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1189, 1189 
(1997) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform (1996) 
[hereinafter Posner, Federal Courts]) (arguing, contrary to Posner, that the federal courts 
are in crisis, with the caseload having an "adverse effect on the quality of justice"). 
Complaints about caseload increases are nothing new. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, 
Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in The Courts, the Public, and 
the Law Explosion 29, 31 (Harry W.Jones ed., 1965) (discussing the recurrent problems of 
court congestion and the lack of effective remedies). 
13. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. II, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts, Additional Judgeships Authorized by Judgeship Acts (last modified Mar. 
23, 2000) <http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablec.pdf> (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). Commentators have Jong suggested that the increase in the number of judgeships 
is a response to increasing caseloads. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and 
the Federal Judicial System, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1209, 1211-12 (1992) ("It is a truism 
that there has been an explosion in the caseload ... and at the same time a considerable 
expansion of the size of the judiciary itself .... The driving reason for that expansion has 
been, of course, the expansion in the caseload itself ... ."). John De Figueiredo and 
Emerson Tiller have shown empirically that increasing caseload is a factor, but not the only 
consideration, motivating Congress to create new judgeships. See John M. De Figueiredo 
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caseload has grown even faster. 14 Critics have complained that appellate 
courts now often seem more like appellate factories, 15 with curtailed op-
portunities for oral argument16 and many cases resolved in nonpreceden-
tial orders.17 Increasing the number of judgeships seems like an attrac-
tive solution to some, 18 but not to others, who worry that a dramatic 
increase would further depersonalize the courts. 19 
The second criticism is that decisions of the courts of appeals are 
excessively ideological.20 A number of scholars have shown that judicial 
ideology, even when crudely measured by political affiliation, is a statisti-
& Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & Econ. 435, 439 (1996). 
14. The number of appeals filed has risen exponentially in the past 60 years, and the 
Administrative Office has forecast a four-fold increase in total appeals filed over the next 
20. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Long Range Plan for the Feaeral Courts 
156 (1995) <http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
[hereinafter Long Range Plan]. Recently, the number of appeals has dropped slightly. 
See Leonidas Ralph Meacham, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 
of the United States Courts: 1999 Caseload Highlights 13 (1999) <http:/ I 
www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/99highlights.pdf> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(reporting a three percent drop in appeals filings from the previous year, excluding 
original proceedings). This dip is probably aberrational. 
15. The increase in caseload has resulted in a wide variety of what Thomas Baker calls 
"intramural reforms" to process appellate cases more expeditiously. See Thomas E. Baker, 
An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 
863, 864 (1994) ("New internal operating procedures, screening and inventorying, the 
nonargument calendar, dispositions without opinion, larger numbers of staff attorneys and 
law clerks, and other related court-initiated reforms have allowed the courts of appeals to 
cope with the large increases in the numbers of appeals over the last generation."). 
16. For discussion of whether oral argument is necessary, compare Stanley Mosk, In 
Defense of Oral Argument, 1 J. Appellate Prac. & Process 25, 26-27 (1999) (expounding 
the importance of oral argument at the appellate level), with Robert J. Martineau, The 
Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1, 32-33 (1986) (advocating a reduction in appellate oral argument). 
17. See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They 
Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions 
Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757, 802 (1995) (discussing the dangers of 
unpublished decisions). 
18. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79 A.B.A. J., Jan. 
1993, at 52, 53 (proposing that Congress double the size of the courts of appeals). See 
generally Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the 
Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 45-49 (summarizing arguments for and against 
adding judgeships). 
19. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal 
Judiciary, 76 Judicature 187, 187-88 (1993) (discussing the negative impact of increasing 
the number of judgeships); see also Jon 0. Newman, Are 1,000 FederalJudges Enough? 
Yes. More Would Dilute the Quality, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1993, at A17 (same). 
20. This criticism is not directed at the courts of appeals alone. Proponents of the 
"attitudinal model" argue that most Supreme Court cases are decided primarily on 
ideological bases. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model 64-69 (1993). For an excellent critical evaluation of the attitudinal 
model, see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251, 279-311 (1997). 
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cally significant predictor of case outcomes.21 This observation, though 
somewhat controversial,22 is hardly surprising. Even if judges are not 
consciously seeking to advance their political agendas, law is indetermi-
nate,23 and a judge who is liberal or conservative cannot always escape 
her personal philosophy in balancing competing arguments.24 This may 
21. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp & C.K. Rowland, Policymaking and Politics in the 
Federal District Courts 51-83 (1983) (describing the ideological impact presidents can 
have on decisions of judges they appoint); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial 
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 107 Yale LJ. 2155, 2175 (1998) [hereinafter, Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship] 
(finding that party affiliation of judges on the D.C. Circuit influences outcomes of cases); 
Malcolm M. Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable" in Judicial Decision-Making: An 
Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4 Polity 91, 99 (1971) (demonstrating that party 
affiliation of Michigan Supreme Courtjudges influences their decision-making); Sheldon 
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 491, 504-05 (1975) (finding party affiliation of judges to impact decision making 
greatly); Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. Crim. L. 
Criminology & Police Sci. 333, 334-35 (1962) (presenting evidence that "on the bipartisan 
supreme courts Democratic and Republican judges do differ from one another in deciding 
criminal cases"); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. 
Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717, 1766-72 (1997) (suggesting that D.C. Circuit judges employ a 
"strategically ideological approach to judging"); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, 
Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title 
VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1073, 1171-81 (1992) (finding 
party affiliation to affect judges' rulings on the lack-of-interest defense in Title VII cases); 
Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986, 43 W. Pol. Q. 317, 322-29 (1990) (presenting 
statistical evidence showing party affiliation's impact on judges' voting behavior in appeals 
courts); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and 
Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 349, 368-69 (1999) 
[hereinafter Tiller & Spiller, Strategic Instruments] (describing how a court could insulate 
its rulings from review by higher courts with opposing ideology). 
22. See Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of 
Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 619, 621-22 
(1985) (critiquing the view of courts as "essentially political bodies"). 
23. As Ken Kress persuasively argues, this means only that many legal questions can be 
answered in different ways, not that law can never provide correct answers or reasons to 
think that some answers are better than others. See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 
Cal. L. Rev. 283, 283-85, 336-37 (1989). 
24. Someone who does not believe that ideology matters at all must be puzzled by 
those who worry about the effect that a particular presidential election would have on the 
judiciary. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Supremes in the Dock: The High Court's 
Balance of Power May Turn Into a Hot Issue, Newsweek, Apr. 10, 2000, at 48 (speculating 
on how the next president's Supreme Court appointments could reshape the law). Surely 
the power to select judges does not invite attention solely because one presidential 
candidate might be more skilled than another at identifying talented judicial candidates, 
independent of philosophy. And while personal philosophy and judicial philosophy may 
be separable, surely there is a correlation between them, as those who are politically liberal 
are more likely to become liberals on the bench than those who are politically 
conservative, and vice versa. Moreover, concern about the politics of judicial nominees is 
nothing new. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court 
Selection From Roosevelt Through Reagan 7-9 (1997) (surveying concerns of early 
presidents about political beliefs of their judicial nominees). 
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be unavoidable, but what is perhaps more troubling is that entire circuits 
seem to have ideological casts, with the liberal Ninth Circuit and the con-
servative Fourth Circuit currently perceived as being on opposite sides of 
the spectrum. 25 
These two criticisms have been made largely independently, but they 
are conceptually linked. The essence of the first criticism is that the 
courts of appeals have a "big numbers" problem. There either will be too 
many cases for panels to devote adequate attention to each one, or too 
many judges to maintain the coherence and integrity of the courts of 
appeals. The second criticism, meanwhile, amounts to a "small numbers" 
problem. Because only three judges decide the vast majority of appeals, 
the outcome of many will depend on the happenstance of which judges 
are on a particular panel26 and in which circuit a particular suit is 
brought.27 The small numbers problem thus exists because of the big 
numbers problem. Given the large caseload, each case must be assigned 
to a panel that represents a small subset of the courts of appeals, but the 
decision of one randomly selected panel might be different from that of 
another. 
Both criticisms suggest that as courts and caseloads become bigger, it 
is increasingly difficult to identify a particular decision as "a decision of 
the U.S. courts of appeals." Technically, of course, every decision is la-
beled as emanating from one of the circuits of the courts of appeals, but 
decisions may seein to be more the product of some bureaucratic process 
than the reasoned conclusions of a known group of individuals. There is 
a large enough number of judges that the institutional identity of the 
courts of appeals, and even of individual circuits, is ever more indepen-
dent of the identities of individual judges, who emerge as the machine's 
cogs (albeit powerful and thoughtful ones) rather than as the machine 
itself. So large is the machine that some lawyers doubt whether particular 
25. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Criticizing Appeals Court, Restore a Death 
Sentence, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1998, at A22 ("The Ninth Circuit ... remains the country's 
most liberal appeals court .... "); Brooke A. Masters, 4th Circuit Pushing to Right, Wash. 
Post, Dec. 19, 1999, at Cl (describing the Fourth Circuit as perhaps "the most conservative 
in the country"); Larry O'Dell, This Court is a 'Supreme' Challenge, Charleston Gazette, 
Apr. 18, 2000 ("[T]he 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has gained a reputation as the 
most boldly conservative appellate circuit in the nation."). 
26. Three-judge panels are generally assigned cases through random selection. See, 
e.g., 3d Cir. Internal Operating Proc. 1.1 ("[F]ully briefed cases are randomly assigned ... 
to a threejudge panel .... "). Random assignment, however, is not required by statute. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1994). 
27. Venue may be proper in more than one circuit. For example, administrative law 
cases may be filed in either the D.C. Circuit or in some other circuit. See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 976, 998-99 
(1982). Moreover, even if the law provides for only one circuit in which a particular suit 
might be brought, this lack of ambiguity does not necessarily make the decisionmaking 
process any less random. Rules can be both clear and arbitrary. 
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opm1ons speak for the judge listed as the author, 2s let alone for the 
panel, let alone for the circuit, let alone for the courts of appeals as a 
whole, let alone as the voice of the 'judicial Power."29 
This Part assesses existing proposals responding to criticisms that the 
courts of appeals are either unable to cope with their caseloads or are 
excessively ideological. I hope to show that although some of the propos-
als have merit, none is likely to provide an adequate answer even to the 
specific problems at which it aims. At the same time, the analysis of the 
limits of the proposals may help point the way toward a solution. 
A. Proposals to Accommodate Caseload 
This section will survey two types of possible structural responses to 
the increase in the size of the federal judiciary. The first is to split cir-
cuits, and the second is to create an additional tier of circuit courts, ei-
ther below or above the existing circuits. Both of these approaches are 
responses to the prospect that increasing caseloads will heighten inconsis-
tency among decisionmakers. But each is limited by attacking inconsis-
tency for inconsistency's sake. Inconsistency is problematic not only be-
cause it might lead to confusion in structuring commercial transactions 
or other arrangements, but also because its existence means that at least 
one court has not arrived at the best answer to a particular legal 
question. 30 
1. Splitting Circuits. - The most obvious structural response to the 
increasing number of judges and cases in the federal appellate courts 
would be to split bloated circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, into two or 
more pieces. This approach has a historical pedigree, most recently with 
the 1981 split of the Fifth Circuit into the independent Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits.31 If splitting a circuit has any effect at all on whether a 
randomly selected panel decision is more or less likely to be what the 
28. The alternative possibility is that the opinion speaks only for a law clerk or staff 
attorney. See, e.g., Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 143-57 (documenting and 
assessing the rise of law clerks and staff attorneys); Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court 
of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the Media Age, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 621, 628-41 
(1999) (discussing the role of law clerks in drafting judicial opinions). 
29. U.S. Const. art. III,§§ 1, 2. 
30. Inconsistency, moreover, probably cannot be completely eliminated. Arthur 
Hellman has persuasively argued, with the aid of an empirical test, that no existing 
structural reform proposal is likely to eliminate the unpredictability of appellate 
adjudication. Even where the law is clear, it may be unclear how the law applies to various 
factual situations, and different judges are likely to take different positions. See Arthur D. 
Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
1029, 1107 (1999). 
31. For discussions of the Fifth Circuit split, see Deborah J. Barrow & Thomas G. 
Walker, A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics of Judicial 
Reform 246 (1988) (studying political interactions between appellate courts and other 
branches of government through the lens of the Fifth Circuit split); Robert A. Ainsworth, 
Jr., Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 523, 
532-33 (describing background and passage of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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majority of all U.S. courts of appeals judges would have decided, the ef-
fect is likely to be negative. Smaller groups of judges are inherently less 
likely to be representative than larger groups. In addition, judges are not 
randomly assigned to circuits, 32 and, all else being equal, two judges are 
at least marginally more likely to be similar in any given respect if they are 
on the same circuit than if they are on a different one. En bane decisions 
will thus be quirkier in a smaller circuit, and judges may emulate this 
quirkiness in writing panel opinions. 
Smaller circuits would also allow for more unrestrained decisionmak-
ing. The smaller the group, the more intense the relationship between 
any two members of the group, and thus the more difficult it may be for 
one judge to evaluate another's work objectively, either when sitting on a 
panel with that judge or when evaluating that judge's opinion in response 
to a suggestion for rehearing en bane. In addition, it is easier for a judge 
to count votes on a small circuit than on a large one and thus to know 
what she can get away with. Besides, a judge can count on herself and the 
panel member who agreed with her, and these two votes are a larger per-
centage of a majority in a small circuit than in a large one. 
Nor will splitting circuits be successful in eliminating inconsistent 
and unpredictable decisionmaking. It is of course true that fewer direct 
conflicts will occur when there are fewer binding precedents, just as fewer 
cars will crash into one another when other vehicles are prevented from 
traveling on a particular highway.33 Any instance of intracircuit conflict 
avoided by a split, however, is necessarily an instance of intercircuit con-
flict created. Indeed, the amount of intercircuit conflict created will be 
greater than the amount of intracircuit conflict avoided, because splitting 
a circuit frees panels in one of the new circuits from having to attempt to 
achieve consistency with the panels of the other. 
Meanwhile, even if it is possible to predict what some particular 
judges will do,34 it will be difficult to predict with confidence what deci-
Reorganization Act); Burke Marshall, Book Review, 63 Tu!. L. Rev. 1241, 1246-47 (1989) 
(reviewing Barrow & Walker, supra). 
32. This is in part because of the considerable role that individual senators may have 
in controlling appointments in their states. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a 
Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 467, 529-31 (1998) (discussing the practice of senatorial courtesy). 
33. It is possible, however, to exaggerate the number of conflicts that will arise in a 
large circuit and the significance of such conflicts. See Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and 
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 541, 574-94 (1989) (demonstrating that direct circuit conflicts in the Ninth 
Circuit are both rare and unlikely to affect primary activity). 
34. Evan Osborne has recently shown that the U.S. legal system is highly predictable, 
in the sense that pretrial predictions account for a great deal of the variance in outcomes. 
See Evan Osborne, Courts as Casinos? An Empirical Investigation of Randomness and 
Efficiency in Civil Litigation, 28]. Legal Stud. 187, 202-03 (1999). This does not, however, 
mean that individual appeals are predictable. 
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sion a panel of three randomly selected judges will reach. 35 If there are 
just two judges in a circuit whose resolutions of a particular issue are un-
predictable, then, because those two judges might be on the same panel, 
the decision of the circuit as a whole is unpredictable.36 Moreover, 
whatever predictability benefits are achieved by virtue of having a "known 
bench"37 are likely to be dwarfed by the costs of having less binding pre-
cedent. The greater the number of cases previously decided, the greater 
the predictability of the law.38 Because a smaller circuit will decide fewer 
Fourth Amendment cases than a larger one, for example, that area of law 
will be less predictable than it would be in the absence of a circuit split. 39 
35. On a court with seven judges, there are 35 different permutations of threejudge 
panels. 
36. If a circuit reheard all cases en bane in which the panel reached a decision 
contrary to what the en bane division would reach, this residual unpredictability might be 
eliminated. It is implausible, however, that nearly so much en bane review would occur. 
See Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of 
the United States Courts: 1999 Annual Report of the Director 47 tbl.S-1 (1999) <http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/judbusl999/s0lsep99.pdf> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(providing statistics on the frequency of en bane review). If all cases in which there might 
be an inconsistency were reviewed, much of the advantage of hearing cases in three-judge 
panels would be lost. 
37. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final 
Report 48 (1998) <http://www.app.com.uscourts.gov> (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) [hereinafter Final Report); see also infra note 86. 
38. The effect may be relatively small. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 30, at 1085-88 
(showing that a rule that made panel decisions binding on all circuits would not greatly 
increase predictability). Nonetheless, given the large number of combinations of three-
judge panels even in a relatively small court, see supra note 35, it seems unlikely that the 
increase in predictability attributable to less diverse personality in a smaller court would be 
greater than the decrease in predictability attributable to a massive reduction in the 
quantity of binding precedent. Like Hellman, I suspect that structural decisions will have 
little effect on predictability. See Hellman, supra note 30, at 1107. Part of the basis for this 
suspicion is that in every appellate case not settled, a party that lost presumably believed it 
had a chance of winning. If larger circuits' law were less predictable, then they would hear 
disproportionately more cases than smaller circuits. A preliminary glance at the data 
suggests that they do not. Compare Mecham, supra note 36, at 102-04 tbl.B-3A (counting 
appeals), with id. at 130-32 tbl.C (counting total civil district court cases). My calculations 
show that the Ninth Circuit has a civil appeals rate of 14. 7%, making it quite average, as the 
other circuits' rates vary from 10.3% to 18.6%. 
39. A counterargument would be that it is the existence of precedents that makes the 
law predictable, rather than any binding force that these precedents have on 
decisionmakers. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private 
Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 236 (1979) (suggesting that the production of precedents by 
the courts is a positive externality). On this theory, judges in a particular division could 
still examine the decisions of other divisions, and the accumulated wisdom of those 
decisions would make the judges' decisions predictable. Indeed, the decisions of any given 
circuit have only a trivial effect on the predictability of law on this theory, because even a 
division with no binding precedent could look to the law of other circuits for guidance. 
While the mere writing of opinions may marginally increase predictability, if a merely 
persuasive authority is so convincing that it makes an outcome predictable, then that 
outcome would be similarly predictable if the same argument were developed in a brief. 
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2. Adding Tiers. - The Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, chaired by former Justice Byron R. White, 
recently proposed that the Ninth Circuit be divided vertically rather than 
horizontally.40 Under this proposal, the Ninth Circuit would be divided 
into three geographically based "divisions," including, for example, the 
Southern Division, which would include the Districts of Arizona and Cen-
tral and Southern California. 41 Though some administrative functions of 
the Ninth Circuit would be centralized,42 each division would in essence 
operate as a separate circuit with its own en bane court. The proposal 
also would create a "Circuit Division," composed of thirteen judges from 
the circuit, "whose sole mission would be to resolve conflicting decisions 
between the regional divisions."43 
The Commission stressed that "large appellate units have difficulty 
developing and maintaining consistent and coherent law."44 If there 
were a smaller number of judges in an "appellate unit," the Commission 
argued, there would be fewer cases with which any given decision might 
conflict. The creation of the Circuit Division, meanwhile, would ensure 
consistency among the divisions.45 In addition, the Commission claimed 
that "[d]ecisions should ... become more predictable because a divi-
sional arrangement that creates smaller, more stable groups of reviewers 
will allow district judges to know better who will be reviewing their deci-
sions, and lawyers to know better the judges who will be deciding their 
cases."46 
This alleged coherence and predictability come at a price: the crea-
tion of an additional level of review.47 The coherence and predictability 
benefits, moreover, may be illusory. Just as splitting circuits only substi-
tutes intercircuit for intracircuit conflict, dividing circuits reduces in-
tradivisional conflict only at the expense of interdivisional conflict. Simi-
larly, the small size of divisions would lead to less binding precedent and 
thus less predictability. Of course, the Circuit Division would be available 
to eliminate conflicts, but this function could be accomplished also by an 
en bane panel without dividing the circuit.48 That the Circuit Division 
40. See Final Report, supra note 37, at 40-47. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. at 46-47. 
43. Id. at 45. The 13 judges would include the Chief Judge and four judges from each 
of the three divisions. See id. 
44. Id. at 47. 
45. See id. at 48-49. 
46. Id. at 48. 
47. "[I]f the Ninth Circuit were the only circuit to implement these changes, litigants 
in the Ninth Circuit would have to go through one more layer of judicial review than 
would litigants in other circuits before reaching the Supreme Court." Recent Cases, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 822, 825 (2000). 
48. Note that under the Commission's proposal, the Circuit Division's membership 
would change annually, as members would serve three-year, staggered terms. See Final 
Report, supra note 37, at 45 (asserting that this would provide for "continuity of 
membership, along with gradual rotation", a contradiction in terms). Given the relatively 
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would be reviewing interdivisional conflicts rather than inconsistencies 
among panel decisions makes no difference at all. 
An alternative would be to create a new tier above the existing circuit 
courts. Indeed, one of the oldest proposals for managing the increased 
caseload of the appellate courts is to create a National Court of Ap-
peals. 49 The purpose of such a court would be to resolve intercircuit con-
flicts, 50 as well as, in some versions, help manage the certiorari docket of 
the Supreme Court.51 This proposal is all but dead,5 2 in part because one 
of its primary motivations was to alleviate caseload pressure on the Su-
preme Court, which has managed to whittle its docket on its own.53 The 
proposal is nonetheless worth considering as a theoretical matter, partic-
ularly because adding additional tiers above the circuit level may come to 
seem more attractive as the caseload and size of the circuit courts contin-
ues to grow. 
This proposal, however, does not demand detailed analysis, for its 
flaws are quite similar to those of the proposed break-up of the Ninth 
Circuit. On one hand, the composition of a single National Court of Ap-
peals consisting of a small number of judges would be less regional than 
small number of en bane decisions in a particular year, however, this personnel continuity 
is unlikely to be greater than in the Ninth Circuit's existing approach, which is to convene 
en bane panels consisting of a randomly chosen ten judges plus the Chief Judge. See infra 
note 97 and accompanying text. If continuity in membership were particularly important, 
this benefit could be achieved through appointments to the en bane panel in the same 
manner as proposed for the Circuit Division. 
49. See Federal Judicial Ctr., Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the 
Supreme Court 47-48 (1972) (proposing the creation ofa National Court of Appeals); see 
also Edward Dumbauld, A National Court of Appeals, 29 Geo. LJ. 461, 468 (1941) 
(arguing for a National Court of Appeals). Arguments against the National Court of 
Appeals include William H. Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals, 
25 Hastings LJ. 1313, 1347-49 (1974); Charles L. Black, Jr., The National Court of 
Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 Yale LJ. 883, 885-94 (1974); and William]. Brennan, Jr., 
The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 473, 475-76 (1973). 
For a current critique, see Dragich, supra note 18, at 49-52. 
50. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. 
J., Apr. 1983, at 442, 442 (calling on Congress to establish a "panel to resolve intercircuit 
conflicts"). 
51. See generally Samuel Estreicher &John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the 
Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681, 690-92 
(1984) (reviewing the debate over the proposition that the National Court of Appeals 
would have improved the Supreme Court's "performance of its essential constitutional and 
judicial functions"). 
52. The Administrative Conference's most recent long range plan rejects the proposal 
and similar ones. See Long Range Plan, supra note 14, at 46. The Conference asserted 
that "[c]urrent empirical data on the number, frequency, tolerability, and persistence of 
unresolved intercircuit conflicts (i.e., those not heard by the Supreme Court) indicate that 
intercircuit inconsistency is not a problem that now calls for change." Id. 
53. In the October 1988 term, the Supreme Court granted review for 223 cases on its 
appellate docket, or 10.4%. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 394, 
398 tbl.II (1989). Ten years later, in the October 1998 Term, the Supreme Court granted 
review of 72 cases on its appellate docket, or just 3.5%. See The Supreme Court, 1998 
Term, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 400, 407 tbl.II(b) (1999). 
1612 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1600 
the composition of any lower court of appeals. On the other hand, be-
cause of its small size, the court's composition would not necessarily mir-
ror the composition of the broader courts of appeals. Accidents of tim-
ing could lead to a statistically aberrant number of Republicans versus 
Democrats on the court, or, party labels aside, an aberrant number of 
judges on any side of a particular issue. In addition, the composition of 
the National Court of Appeals would differ significantly from that of the 
Supreme Court, leading to the possibility that the National Court of Ap-
peals and the Supreme Court might tug the law in different directions. 
Adding layers of review, in short, would not necessarily improve decision-
making. It would merely prolong it and shift power from one group of 
judges to an equally fallible group designated as hierarchically superior. 
B. Proposals to Neutralize Ideology 
1. C/,earer Substantive Law. - A tempting approach to avoiding ideo-
logically-based decisionmaking is to minimize opportunities for judicial 
discretion. Perhaps there are some areas oflaw in which judicially crafted 
standards and balancing tests might give way to bright-line rules,54 and 
perhaps Congress might learn to draft statutes more clearly to minimize 
the number of ambiguities.55 Ultimately, though, such a project can ac-
complish only so much. No matter how diligently legislators, administra-
tive agencies, and judges attempt to make themselves clear, it is never 
possible to anticipate the full range of questions that will arise in a partic-
ular legal regime. There will always be statutory gaps and hard cases. 
To be sure, law could be more rule-like, but this would not necessa-
rily make the law better. The point of rules is to prevent some factors 
from being considered, so a rule may dictate one result even when the 
background justifications for the rule would dictate another.56 The 
choice between rules and standards is thus a tradeoff of incongruities. 
Application of a rule will not always be equivalent to what a majority of a 
large group of judges would decide in particular cases if there were no 
rule. But application of a standard by a subset of a group of judges will 
54. Justice Scalia is a prominent expositor of the position that law should be more 
rule-like. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 
1176-83 ( 1989). For a critique of the view that judges can apply neutral principles, see 
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 806-21 (1983). 
55. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: 
Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 Harv. J. on Legis. 
123, 133-36, 154-63, 171-73 (1992) (discussing various approaches to reducing 
ambiguities in statutes). 
56. This is fundamental to Frederick Schauer's account of rules. See Frederick 
Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Law and in Life 47-52 (1991) (explaining how rules are entrenched 
generalizations). The result is that rule-based decisionmaking is necessarily suboptimal, 
though it still may be a superior decisionmaking procedure to one that does not involve 
rules. See id. at 100-02. 
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also not be equivalent to what a majority of the entire group would de-
cide, because subsets may not be representative.57 Even the best rule may 
thus be inferior to a standard, if the goal is to treat cases as often as possi-
ble as most judges would believe they ideally should be treated. 
2. Split Panels. - It is thus understandable that, until recently, no 
scholars have suggested any concrete means of reducing the effect of ide-
ology in decisionmaking. In a July 1999 essay in the Columbia Law Review, 
however, Professors Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross, both positive politi-
cal theorists who have worked to measure and analyze the impact of ide-
ology and strategy on decisionmaking, 58 recognized that a structural 
mechanism might reduce the amount of ideological decisionmaking.59 
In particular, Tiller and Cross noted that threejudge panels are most 
likely to decide cases ideologically when all three judges are members of 
the same political party.60 The inevitability of decisionmaking by panels, 
they recognized, does not mean that politically unified panels are likewise 
57. Schauer observes that one reason that a decisionmaker might follow a rule, rather 
than consider what outcome background justifications would demand, is because the 
decisionmaker "may have prudential epistemic reasons for doubting her own decision-
making capacities compared to those of the rule-maker." Id. at 125. Schauer does not 
focus on the role of rules in constraining decisionmakers to whom are delegated certain 
decisionmaking tasks by a larger group concerned that the individual decisionmakers 
might place different weight on the background justifications than the group as a whole 
would. He does emphasize, however, that establishing rules may decrease the possibility of 
"error" by decisionmakers, see id. at 143-45, and that rules may effectively serve to allocate 
power among judges and others, see id. at 158-62. 
58. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An 
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 741, 
745-46 (2000) (stating that empirical work suggests thatJustices "use legal analysis as post-
hoc rationalization for preferred policies"); Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 Int'! Rev. 
L. & Econ. 503, 505-19 ( 1996) (developing a rational choice framework for understanding 
Congress' reversals of Supreme Court decisions); Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by 
Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 114, 132-33 (1998) (arguing that courts may affect agency policymaking by reviewing 
agency processes; Tiller & Spiller, Strategic Instruments, supra note 21, at 369-70 
(describing how agencies and courts use rulemaking, guidelines, and policy statements in 
decisionmaking); Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 Duke LJ. 511, 531-47 (1998) 
[hereinafter Cross, The Justices of Strategy] (reviewing Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The 
Choices Justices Make (1998)) (noting shortcomings in political science research in 
judicial decisionmaking). 
59. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving 
American Justice, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 226-34 (1999) [hereinafter Tiller & Cross, A 
Modest Proposal]. 
60. See id. at 215 n.l (citing Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship, supra note 21, at 
2168-72). They also noted that at certain times, the probability of a politically unified 
panel in a particular circuit may be quite high. See id. at 228 tbl.4 (showing that in 1992, 
in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, there was between a 54% and 77% 
chance of drawing a panel composed of all Republicans). 
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inevitable.61 They thus proposed that every panel contain at least one 
Democrat and one Republican. 62 
This proposal would help reduce the variability of panel decision-
making, but only somewhat. Tiller and Cross persuasively argue that if 
one of the majority party judges is more moderate than the other, then 
that individual "may be able to forge a more centrist outcome with the 
weaker ideologue from the majority party coalition, thereby moderating 
against extreme partisan outcomes."63 Tiller and Cross, however, do not 
claim that the difference between politically divided and politically uni-
fied panels is large. Rather, in their study of panels' decisions regarding 
whether to defer to or strike down an administrative agency decision in 
applying the Chevron doctrine, Tiller and Cross conclude that "it is 17% 
less likely that the court will defer when it is unified than when it is split 2-
1."64 It is pointless to debate whether this is a lot or a little; it is surely 
61. See id. at 215-18. 
62. Tiller & Cross point out that this would be easy to implement: 
[W]hen assigning threejudge panels to cases, the court clerk would first divide 
the circuit members by appointing president. The clerk would then randomly 
select one representative from each party and assign those judges to the case. 
Then all the judges who were not selected would be placed together, irrespective 
of party, and the third judge would be randomly selected from this group. 
Id. at 233. Tiller and Cross acknowledge that their proposal might cause an unbalanced 
workload when fewer than one-third of the judges in a particular circuit are of the minority 
party, but they suggest that "[t]his problem could be resolved by using senior status judges 
from that party, or by having district court judges of that party sit by designation." Id. 
63. Id. at 228. Challenging this argument, Judge Patricia Wald argues that "a judge 
will not always hew to the party line, however defined." Patricia M. Wald, A Response to 
Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235, 239 (1999). As a critique of the merits of the 
proposal, this argument is weak, because the proposal depends only on some correlation 
between party membership and ideology. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A 
Modest Reply to Judge Wald, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 262, 263-64 (1999) [hereinafter Tiller & 
Cross, Modest Reply] (making this point in rebuttal). Of course judges, or at least federal 
judges, are not looking to party leaders to see how they should vote for the good of the 
party. But Republicans tend to be more conservative than Democrats, and, at least on 
some issues, liberal judges will tend to see things differently from more conservative 
judges. One need not look further than the Supreme Court for convincing verification of 
such a tendency. In recent years, many cases have been decided with a familiar 5 to 4 split. 
See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term, supra note 53, at 405 tbl.I (showing that in seven of 
16 decisions decided by a 5 to 4 margin, the same alignment of Justices Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas prevailed, and that in an additional eight, no 
more than one justice from each side defected). 
64. Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship, supra note 21, at 2171. Cross and Tiller state 
that when a panel defers to the agency, it is "follow[ing]" the Chevron doctrine. See id: at 
2173 fig.2. This terminology is misleading, since Chevron requires judges to reject agency 
decisions that are clearly inconsistent with the statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Judge Wald criticizes Tiller 
and Cross for this: 
I suspect that what Tiller and Cross have discovered is not mass lawlessness by the 
D.C. Circuit's Republican appointees, but some individualized facets of the 
judicial styles of the small group of Republicans in their sample whose opinion-
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enough to merit concern,65 but not enough to justify the conclusion that 
panels will resolve cases as a majority of all courts of appeals judges would 
resolve them.66 
Tiller and Cross explain that the principal advantage of mixed 
panels is what they refer to as a "whistleblower" effect.67 "The idea here," 
they explain, "is that if the partisan majority members were to manipulate 
or ignore doctrine, the minority member would expose them through a 
dissent."68 Judges might be willing to indulge bad reasoning if they can 
be confident that no one will call them on it, 69 or they might even trade 
writing idiosyncrasies would naturally show up more strongly in a pool of unified 
panels than in a pool of mixed panels. 
Wald, supra note 63, at 244. Whether judges' decisions amount to "mass lawlessness," 
however, is not the point. Cf. Tiller & Cross, Modest Reply, supra note 63, at 262 (noting 
that it does not matter whether judicial actions are conscious or unconscious). What I 
consider to be the ultimate point is that different judges will decide many cases differently, 
and the more similar judges are, the greater the chance they will decide a particular case in 
a manner different from how the majority would decide it. 
65. More precisely, it matters as long as the effect is not merely a product of statistical 
chance. The finding was significant at the 0.10 level, but not at the 0.05 level. See Cross & 
Tiller, Judicial Partisanship, supra note 21, at 2170 tbl.2. 
66. Even with the Tiller and Cross system, there is still a substantial probability that a 
panel decision will differ from what the decision of a circuit as a whole would be. Suppose 
what seems to make the strongest possible case for the Tiller and Cross approach, that 
there is some issue on which political affiliation correlates perfectly with how judges would 
vote on a particular issue. Ensuring that there are divided panels would actually decrease 
the probability that a particular case would be decided in accordance with the majority 
position. This may seem counterintuitive, but the reduction in all-majority panels 
attributable to their proposal more than offsets the reduction in all-minority panels. 
Suppose, for example, that an lljudge circuit has six Republicans and five Democrats, all 
of whom will necessarily vote the party line. If a threejudge panel is randomly selected, 
the probability that a majority of Republicans will control is (5*6C2 + 6C3)/11C3 = 95/165 
(that is, the total number of panels with two or three Republicans divided by the total 
number of panels, where ,C, represents the number of combinations possible in selecting y 
objects from x possibilities), or about 58%. If first a Republican and a Democrat are 
selected, then there are nine judges left, of whom five are Republicans, so the chance that 
a Republican is selected is 5/9, or about 56%. 
67. See Tiller & Cross, A Modest Proposal, supra note 59, at 228-32; Cross & Tiller, 
Judicial Partisanship, supra note 21, at 2169-74. 
68. Tiller & Cross, A Modest Proposal, supra note 59, at 228-29. 
69. If a threejudge panel consists of one judge who feels strongly about an issue and 
two judges who do not, the uninterested judges might sign on to the passionate judge's 
opinion regardless of whether they agree. As Judge Posner acknowledges: 
Even in a threejudge panel, provided that at least one judge has a strong opinion 
on the proper outcome of the case, or even that a law clerk of one judge has a 
strong opinion on the matter, the other judges, if not terribly interested in the 
case, may simply cast their vote with the 'opinionated' judge. 
Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 123 (1995). A majority may thus give in even to a 
whistleblower with whom they disagree. For the whistleblower effect to be strongest, there 
must be two opinionated judges who lean to opposite sides of an issue. 
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votes across cases.70 Similarly, mere exposure to counterarguments may 
save judges from casting votes that they might otherwise have cast in par-
tial ignorance.71 No matter what the party composition of a panel, how-
ever, there may be relatively few cases in which the whistleblower effect is 
likely to matter. After all, few opinions generate dissents at all. 72 Moreo-
ver, the specter of partisan decisionmaking is merely one aspect of a 
broader problem: that a particular panel will see an issue differently 
from most judges, whether its view is ideological or not. Ideological deci-
sionmaking is just one form of nonmajoritarian decisionmaking. Ideally, 
there would be a more comprehensive means of "whistleblowing" on 
judges who make decisions that others would not reach after full consid-
eration of cases. That is what my proposal seeks to provide. 
II. THE PROPOSAL FOR VISITING EN BANC p ANELS 
So far, I have shown that existing reform proposals are unlikely, by 
themselves, to provide adequate answers to the problems associated with 
increasing caseloads and the impact of ideology on judging. The prob-
lem, in short, is that scholars have focused primarily on guiding cases to 
the judges they consider most likely to make good decisions. These ef-
forts may be important, but no matter how many judges make up a cir-
cuit, no matter how many tiers to the courts of appeal, and no matter 
70. For a normative assessment of whether vote trading and other forms of judicial 
compromise are justifiable, see Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on 
Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297, 2323-33 (1999). 
71. Tiller and Cross allude to this aspect, which is likely to be less significant in cases 
that are well-briefed, but downplay it by their use of the word "whistle blower." See Tiller & 
Cross, Modest Reply, supra note 63, at 267 (agreeing with Judge Wald that a would-be 
dissenter sometimes might cause members ofa majority to rethink a particular issue); see 
also id. at 262 (clarifying that "by whistleblowing we did not mean blatant confrontation 
among the members of a panel"). Judge Harry Edwards criticizes Tiller and Cross for 
ignoring the possibility that their effect might be attributable to what he calls "collegiality." 
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 
1335, 1357-59 (1998); see also id. at 1358 ("In ... a collegial deliberative process, we 
would expect to find that the presumed political views of different judges push the 
outcome towards the center of the spectrum (where there is a spectrum)."). In my view, 
this is ultimately a question of semantics, and if "collegiality" is good, it may be desirable to 
induce more of it. Perhaps Tiller and Cross's critics on the bench feel accused by the 
findings that political affiliation is predictive of decisionmaking. To me, these are 
important not because they somehow make judicial decisionmaking suspect, but simply 
because they prove that different people will approach cases differently, an observation 
with which Judge Edwards might well agree. See, e.g., id. at 1360-61 ("It is inevitable and 
probably salutary that judges' different professional and life experiences have some 
bearing on how they initially confront various problems that come before them."). If 
different judges sometimes see the world and decide cases differently, then worrying about 
whether individual threejudge panels are representative is a worthwhile endeavor. 
72. In the first four months of 2000, for example, the courts of appeals issued a total 
of 8452 decisions listed on Westlaw, of which only 219 included dissents, yielding a dissent 
rate of2.6%. Search ofWestlaw, CTAdatabase (Aug. 25, 2000). In part, of course, the low 
dissent rate may be because it is the credible threat of a dissent, not an actual one, that is 
important. 
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what proxies we use to achieve moderate decisionmaking, individual 
cases will still be decided by small numbers of judges, and those judges 
might make decisions that are different from what judges generally would 
decide. The challenge, I will argue, is to craft a mechanism that will in-
crease the incentives that individual judges have to decide cases as judges 
generally would decide them, and correct at least some cases in which 
judges have failed to do so. 
En bane review is the most logical building block for such a mecha-
nism, because it already serves these functions to some extent. Moreover, 
the practice reflects the simple insight that providing for the possibility of 
review by a broad group of judges may be more effective in achieving 
majoritarian decisionmaking than any ex ante steering mechanism could 
be. A simple reform would be to have more en bane review, for example, 
by making it easier for judges to trigger the mechanism.73 Although I am 
sympathetic to the notion that we should have more en bane review, 74 I 
believe that it is more important to reform en bane structurally. Existing 
en bane review may be too embedded in the politics of individual circuits 
to be an effective mechanism of discipline. I do not question that judges 
take en bane review seriously and perform their tasks of reviewing one 
another conscientiously, but there is at least the possibility that collegial-
ity might hinder review,75 or that review might hinder collegiality.76 
More significantly, even if a circuit is able to enforce its will consistently, 
there is little guarantee that it will be enforcing the views of the broader 
appellate judiciary. 
73. See, e.g., Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 
43 Fordham L. Rev. 401, 420 (1974) (maintaining that a tie vote should be sufficient to 
trigger en bane treatment). Interestingly, different circuits use different approaches in 
calculating how many votes are required to take a case en bane. See generally James J. 
Wheaton, Note, Playing with Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges Required to 
Grant En Banc Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 
1511-20 (1984) (exploring different possible definitions of "majority"). 
74. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
75. Recognizing that collegiality in the informal sense of the word might lead to 
hesitance among judges to offer useful criticisms of one another's positions, some have 
defined collegiality as including open-minded debate. See, e.g., Hon. Richard J. 
Cardamone, How an Expanding Caseload Impacts Federal Appellate Procedures, 65 
Brook. L. Rev. 281, 282-83 (1999) (describing collegiality as "give-and-take"). Though an 
atmosphere of friendly criticism is possible and may well be the norm, my point is simply 
that friendliness also can produce reluctance to critique and overrule. 
76. At least some commentators believe that en bane review as currently practiced 
may have adverse effects on collegiality. See, e.g., William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, 
En Banc Review, Horror Pleni, and the Resolution of Patent Law Conflicts, 40 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 787, 795 (2000) ("Judges being human, en bane cases can cause friction between 
the judges on the Federal Circuit. No judge wants his or her opinions subjected to en bane 
review, and some regard a colleague's vote for en bane review of one of their cases as 
tantamount to betrayal.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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A. The Proposal 
If my proposal were enacted, en bane review would work something 
like this:77 Each circuit would schedule en bane review at some fre-
quency, perhaps twice a year. The various circuits would attempt to hold 
these reviews simultaneously for scheduling convenience. Judges in ac-
tive service would be randomly assigned to participate in en bane panels 
about as often. A judge would never participate in such panels for his 
own circuit.7B Each en bane panel would include judges from most if not 
all of the other circuits. Suggestions for rehearing en bane would be 
routed well in advance to the judges on this panel, who would be allowed 
to send memoranda to one another discussing whether particular cases 
should be reviewed. The judges would vote whether to hear individual 
cases, and if a majority voted to hear a case, judges would then vote 
whether to hear it with or without oral argument. For cases with oral 
argument, the government would pay to fly the judges to the particular 
circuit whose cases they are reviewing, or, if the technology is seen as an 
acceptable alternative, videoconferencing could be used.79 After confer-
ence or further debate-by-memorandum, the seniormost judge on the en 
bane panel would assign the writing of the opinion, as is traditional.BO 
The final opinion would indicate the membership of the en bane panel 
and include all the votes. 
I have now offered enough hints about the existing problems of the 
courts of appeals that making an affirmative case for the proposal is quite 
straightforward. The proposal to enact visiting en banes is a modest one, 
not just in a Swiftian sense, and it cannot of course solve everything. It is, 
however, surprisingly responsive to both of the criticisms of the courts of 
appeals discussed above.BI If an oppressive caseload leads judges into 
77. I am flexible about many of the details, including the frequency of review, 
whether larger circuits should be subject to more frequent review, whether the selection of 
judges would be completely random or whether judges might be allowed to express some 
preferences as to which circuits they would review, how far in advance judges would receive 
suggestions for rehearing en bane, whether cases should be heard in the circuit being 
reviewed even where that location is inconvenient for most members of the panel, and 
whether there should be an alternative method of selecting who writes the opinion. 
78. A judge also would not participate in en bane panels for a circuit in which she had 
served as a visiting judge sufficiently recently that one of her own decisions might be 
subject to en bane review. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 291 (1994) (providing for circuit judges to 
sit by designation in other circuits). The existence ofvisitingjudges refutes any suggestion 
that visiting en banes would be unconstitutional. For an interesting analysis of the effect of 
visiting judges, see generally Tracey George, Seen But Not Heard: Visiting Judges on U.S. 
Courts of Appeals 12-30 (Feb. 25, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
79. For an argument that videoconferencing may alleviate logistical problems 
associated with large circuits, see Mike Tonsing, Videoconferencing Could Provide an 
Unexpected Answer in the Dialogue Over Whether to Split the Ninth Circuit, Fed. Law., 
Aug. 1998, at 18. 
80. For a discussion of some of the strategic consequences of this practice, see Cross, 
The Justices of Strategy, supra note 58, at 517-19. 
81. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text. 
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carelessness, en bane decisionmaking already provides some assurance of 
review. In the absence of concern that a reversal82 might offend an im-
mediate colleague, an en bane court might be more willing to catch mis-
takes or reconsider decisions that are incompletely reasoned. In addi-
tion, because visiting en banes would include representative cross-sections 
of judges nationally, en bane decisionmaking would be less ideological.83 
Using visiting en banes will ensure that panel decisions are subject to 
a form of outside review, rather than review by judges' immediate col-
leagues.84 Although judges more than most people are able to make and 
accept constructive criticism, outside review can only strengthen the in-
tegrity of the judicial decisionmaking environment. Judges may be able 
to place aside personal politics the majority of the time in en bane deci-
sionmaking, perhaps even in cases in which they have written the majority 
panel opinion, but certainly it cannot hurt to avoid the discomfort of 
internal review altogether.85 To be sure, collegiality might interfere with 
objectivity even on national en bane panels, but the effect seems likely to 
82. Technically, en bane decisions do not reverse panel decisions. Rather, the 
decision to grant en bane review vacates a panel decision, and the subsequent opinion 
affirms, reverses, or vacates the decisions of the district court. See 4th Cir. R. 35(c). This is 
relevant only in that an evenly divided court affirms the decision of the district court, not 
the decision of the panel, if those are inconsistent. See, e.g., United States v. Cerceda, 172 
F.3d 806, 811-12 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's opinion where the en bane 
court was equally divided). The terminology of "reversal" is in any event useful. 
83. Some commentators have criticized en bane decisionmaking in particular as too 
ideological. See, e.g., Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the "Mini-
Supreme Court," 13 J.L. & Pol. 377, 377 (1997) (noting impact of partisan politics on en 
bane decisions); Note, The Politics of En Banc Review, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 864, 865 (1989) 
(criticizing ideology's influence in en bane review). But see Michael E. Solimine, Ideology 
and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 29, 62-64 (1988) (disputing assertions that 
appointees of President Reagan were particularly likely to use en bane as an ideological 
tool). Perhaps the problem is not the influence of ideology per se, but that en bane courts 
may be imposing quite unrepresentative ideologies on panel decisions. 
84. This system of outside review bears some resemblance to the scientific system of 
peer review. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants 
in Arts and Sciences, 9 High Tech. LJ. l, 2-7 (1994) (describing systems of peer review 
and emphasizing that peer review helps avoid the influence of favoritism and conflicts of 
interests on decisionmaking). It is not identical, of course, in that review would not be 
"blind" (though it presumably could be if this were deemed desirable). Blindness, though, 
is just one way of producing independent decisionmaking. Distance is another, and judges 
are presumably more able to evaluate their more distant colleagues' work objectively than 
they are the work of judges with whom they must work everyday. This will likely lead to 
more exacting en bane review, though some judges might be eager to show up some of 
their immediate colleagues. 
85. Even if judges' decisions on the merits are immune to personal feelings, a judge 
might hesitate before writing a memorandum attacking the decision of two or three 
colleagues to urge that the decision be revisited. Such a memorandum is likely to invite 
vigorous defenses from judges in the panel majority, who are likely to vote against 
rehearing, making the battle an uphill one. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, In Banc Practice in 
the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 365, 379 (1984) ("The in 
bane poll request normally elicits from the author of the panel majority opinion a 
substantial memorandum in opposition to rehearing."). 
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be smaller given that judges would meet less commonly with colleagues 
from other circuits and that judges from the circuit being reviewed would 
not be members of the en bane panel reviewing their work. 
The importance of en bane decisionmaking, however, cannot be 
measured just by assessing those cases in which en bane review is granted. 
Much more important is how en bane review affects panel decisionmak-
ing. The mere prospect of en bane review may discipline decisions of 
members of threejudge panels, leading them to write opinions that are 
less likely to diverge from the anticipated median viewpoint of an en bane 
panel. The vital question is whether this discipline is more effective when 
judges on panels know who their en bane reviewers will be or when they 
do not.86 In my view, an unknown court is superior, because panel mem-
bers will then have to write opinions that will pass muster with typical 
judges, rather than with a known sample of judges who might be atypical. 
Of course, some judges may not care about being reversed even by a visit-
ing en bane panel, but visiting en bane panels should at least be more 
effective than current en bane courts at inducing majoritarian panel 
decisionmaking. 
1. Precedential Consistency. - Before proceeding, I should confront 
two significant arguments against the proposal. Each of these arguments 
accepts the value of majoritarian decisionmaking, but insists that visiting 
en bane panels might have negative consequences. The first of these ar-
guments is that visiting en bane panels might produce considerable vola-
tility within circuits. Because the composition of the en bane panel would 
change from case to case, the law might change frequently as well, as one 
en bane panel overrules its predecessor. More litigants might believe that 
they have a chance of prevailing en bane even when prior en bane au-
thority is directly contrary to their position, because they might happen 
to draw a different set of judges. 
This argument wrongly assumes that an en bane overruling of a prior 
en bane decision would be inherently problematic. Such overruling, 
however, would serve essentially the same purpose as a circuit split: show-
ing the Supreme Court that there is substantial disagreement among 
judges on an issue. An en bane overruling of a prior en bane decision is 
no more problematic than an en bane overruling of a prior panel deci-
sion, since both types of prior decisions control in the absence of en bane 
rehearing. Litigants in one circuit cannot rely on the en bane decision of 
another circuit, and the uncertainty faced by litigants who cannot rely on 
the en bane decision of their own circuit is not significantly greater. Un-
86. Many commentators have long assumed that a "known bench" is superior to an 
unknown one. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding 
Appeals 34-35 (1960) (discussing "known bench" as a stabilizing aspect of appellate 
courts); see also supra text accompanying note 37. This assumption, however, has never 
been adequately defended. It may be that lower court judges prefer a known bench 
because that minimizes the prospect of their decisions' being reversed, but this does not 
mean that a known bench is socially beneficial. 
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less an en bane decision is to fix a rule for all time, the uncertainty attrib-
utable to visiting en bane panels is no different from the uncertainty that 
already exists. 
This argument's more significant flaw is that it assumes that deci-
sional stability is primarily a function of personnel stability. Courts, how-
ever, are not consistent simply because the same judges hear cases repeat-
edly. B7 They are consistent because judges value stare decisis. Even the 
Supreme Court, which does not see itself as strictly bound to its prior 
decisions, ordinarily defers to them, even when no current members of 
the Court participated in the earlier decision.BB Judges recognize the im-
portance of reliance interests,B9 and they also may believe that fairness 
requires that current litigants in a particular circuit be treated in the 
same way as past litigants in that circuit.90 En bane panels are thus likely 
to refuse to hear cases previously resolved by en bane panels of the same 
circuit, and even when they do reconsider issues, they will recognize that 
they are not writing on blank slates. And if judges' own appreciation of 
stare decisis were insufficient, the problem easily could be resolved by 
procedural rules preventing en bane panels from overruling prior en 
bane panels in the absence of intervening Supreme Court decisions. 
2. Ownership. - The second argument against the proposal is that 
enactment of visiting en bane panels would decrease the sense of owner-
ship that judges have in the law of their circuit. This argument has psy-
chological and practical dimensions. The psychological claim is that be-
ing part of a group that controls the law of a circuit is satisfying, and that 
enactment of visiting en bane panels would alienate judges, who then 
might shirk their institutional responsibilities, including panel deci-
sions.91 Any such psychological effect seems likely to be small, and, more 
87. Kornhauser and Sager show that a court can be consistent, though its 
jurisprudence may not be deeply coherent, even if its members have different beliefs and 
values. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale LJ. 
82, 102-15 (1986). This analysis, however, assumes that the entire court hears all cases, so 
consistency will be harder to achieve when many decisions are panel decisions. Even if 
only en bane decisions are considered, a circuit may not be entirely consistent, because the 
membership of en bane panels changes over time, and individual judges may change their 
mind on particular issues. 
88. For a list of cases in which the Supreme Court has overruled earlier decisions, see 
Amy L. Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a 
Decision's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. 
Tennessee, 82 Geo. LJ. 1689, 1726 app. I (1994). 
89. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (stating that 
"[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme" when reliance interests are at 
stake). 
90. But see Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and 
Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 Yale LJ. 2031, 2038 (1996) (arguing that such equality 
concerns fail to justify stare decisis). 
91. This claim might be grounded in the sociological literature addressing small 
group behavior, which is evaluated in Marvin E. Shaw, An Overview of Small Group 
Behavior, in Psychological Foundations of Organizational Behavior 358, 365 (Barry M. 
Staw ed., 1977). 
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importantly, there may be offsetting effects. Visiting en banes might stim-
ulate a friendly competition among different circuits to write opinions 
that are upheld by judges on their fellow circuits, leading judges to put 
more care into panel opinions. In addition, participation in visiting en 
bane panels might provide engagement in a national legal community 
that would substitute for circuit solidarity. In any event, the judges likely 
to dislike the system most are those who write the least majoritarian deci-
sions, precisely the judges whom the proposal targets. 
The practical dimension is that judges within a circuit have greater 
incentive to monitor circuit law for cases that might be en bane-worthy 
than judges outside the circuit.92 In approximately three-quarters of re-
cent en bane cases, however, a member of the panel wrote a dissenting 
opinion, 93 which would provide a strong signal to outside reviewers that a 
case might be en bane-worthy. It is possible that more judges would write 
dissents if visiting en bane panels were enacted. For example, a liberal 
Fourth Circuit judge might be more motivated to write a dissent against a 
conservative decision given the increased possibility of en bane reversal. 
Because dissents perform an informational function, highlighting argu-
ments that others might not have considered, this would be a welcome 
development. In addition, because authoring a visiting en bane opinion 
might be prestigious, judges participating in such panels might scrutinize 
panel decisions to find problematic ones in the hope of being assigned 
the ultimate opinion. 
B. Additional Benefits 
The primary purpose of my central proposal is to make decisionmak-
ing by panels more representative of the decisions that a broad spectrum 
of judges would reach. There are, however, significant additional 
advantages. 
92. An additional practical argument is that because judges would not have to live 
under the rule of a particular en bane opinion, they might be more careless in writing it. 
En bane opinions would still be high profile, or perhaps even higher profile than before, 
and judges would thus still have considerable incentive to be careful. Indeed, the 
argument ultimately might point the other way. Perhaps judges who have to live under a 
particular regime will take their own interests too much into account, for example by being 
biased in favor of bright-line rules relative to balancing tests, even if they believe balancing 
tests to be preferable for society as a whole. Judges who will not be directly affected by a 
decision will take into account the effects on the judiciary, but will not necessarily give 
disproportionate attention to these concerns. 
93. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant 
En Banc Review, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 213, 259-60 (1999) [hereinafter George, Dynamics and 
Determinants] (providing this data for a sample of cases from the Second, Fourth, and 
Eighth Circuits). 
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1. Optimally Sized En Banc Panels. - A prominent argument against 
adding judges to the courts of appeals is that increasing the number of 
judges makes deliberation more difficult.94 Judge Posner explains: 
Although court of appeals judges sit in panels of three, the full 
court must ... maintain a credible threat to rehear a case en 
bane if the panel deviates from the law of the circuit. The threat 
loses much of its credibility when the number of judges reaches 
the level, conventionally taken to be nine, beyond which the de-
liberations of a court come increasingly to resemble those of a 
legislature.95 
In most circuits, all judges in active service participate in en bane cases,96 
and enacting my proposal would free Congress to pick the number it 
finds optimal. 
Using visiting en bane panels is not the only way to achieve optimally 
sized en bane panels, but it is likely the most practical. The Ninth Circuit 
randomly selects elevenjudge en bane panels from within the Circuit.97 
Though this alleviates the problem of unwieldy decisionmaking, such en 
bane panels are likely to be less representative of the U.S. courts of ap-
peals at large than en bane panels drawn at random from all the courts of 
appeals. At the same time, these panels do not necessarily represent even 
the views of the Ninth Circuit as a whole.98 Once the dubious advantage 
of enforcing a "law of the circuit" is lost by using elevenjudge panels, it is 
94. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The 
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 584 (1969) 
("Twenty judges cannot conduct a meaningful hearing, nor can they effectively 
deliberate."). This argument is not entirely persuasive. Legislatures, after all, deliberate 
with far greater numbers, and it seems conceivable that large courts could find ways of 
conducting (and ending) deliberation in an efficient way. 
95. Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 133. I have questioned the notion that 
enforcing a "law of the circuit" (as opposed to law of the circuits more generally) is 
desirable, a question that Judge Posner does not consider. 
96. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994) (providing that, with some exceptions "[a] 
court in bane shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service"). 
97. These panels always include the chief judge of the Circuit. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3 
(providing that in the absence of the chief judge, for example because of recusal, an 
additional judge shall be chosen and the senior active judge shall preside). In theory, the 
court as a whole can rehear en bane a decision of an elevenjudge en bane panel, see id., 
but this has never occurred. See Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1441 
(9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from order rejecting request for rehearing en 
bane by the full court); search ofWESTLAW, CTA9 database (Aug. 28, 2000). 
98. Judge Posner criticizes the Ninth Circuit practice for this reason. He argues that a 
three-judge panel that "goes against what it knows to be the current majority view of the 
court as a whole, knows that being reversed en bane will depend on the luck of the draw," 
thus making three-judge panels "less constrained by the threat of being reversed en bane 
than a panel in another circuit would be." Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 137. 
Posner also reports that "Ninth Circuit lawyers say (but not for attribution!) that more 
often than in any other federal court of appeals the composition of the panel determines 
the outcome of the appeal." Id. This is a flawed argument. Given the infrequency of en 
bane review, an en bane reversal will almost always be unlikely, so being reversed en bane 
will always depend on the luck of the draw. The best way for a judge to avoid en bane 
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difficult to defend including only judges from the circuit rather than 
judges from other courts of appeals. Thus, as the Ninth Circuit arrange-
ment becomes more common, the case for my proposal will become 
stronger. 
2. Improvement of Specialized Courts. - The proposal would also allay 
concerns about specialized federal courts of appeals. Specialized courts 
initially seem to provide a promising, partial solution to the increase in 
caseload of the courts nationally. Yet, they have been subject to several 
criticisms, most notably by Judge Posner. The first is that work on special-
ized courts might be "monotonous," lacking the diversity of subject mat-
ter that otherwise compensates for the "monastic" routine of appellate 
judicial life,99 and this might lower the quality of those who can be re-
cruited to join the appellate ranks. 100 My proposal would mitigate this 
criticism by adding some spice to the specialized appellate judge's activi-
ties, the chance to participate in en bane panels for other circuits. Such 
participation would also help nurture a "generalist" legal perspective in 
specialists. 101 
More important than the participation by specialist judges in gener-
alist en bane, though, would be the participation by generalist judges in 
specialized en bane review. Judge Posner's most significant criticism of 
specialized courts is that such courts are more likely to become ideologi-
cally charged. Creation of specialized courts would highlight fundamen-
tal disagreements among specialists in particular areas and result in the 
ascendancy of one view over another minority view purely on the basis of 
appointment numbers. 102 At the same time, all members of a specialized 
reversal in the Ninth Circuit will be to write a noncontroversial opinion. Randomness 
therefore may make judges less likely to write quirky opinions. 
99. Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 249. Posner ultimately "put[s] little 
weight ... on the matter of job satisfaction through diversity of caseload." Id. As he 
recognizes, some judges might prefer a lack of caseload diversity, and moving some types 
of cases that appellate judges do not enjoy to specialized appellate tribunals might make 
the generalist tribunals more appealing. See also Paul M. Bator, The Judicial Universe of 
Judge Richard Posner, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1146, 1155 (1985) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, 
The Federalist Courts (1985)) ("[M]aking the job of federal judge somewhat less 
grand ... will attract people who are more deeply interested in particular subjects and less 
interested in running everything."). Perhaps even more significantly, even if the subject 
matter of a particular court is uniform, the legal issues can be quite diverse. 
100. Potentially compensating for this, Posner recognizes, is that "[a] person who 
does only one job may perform better than an abler person who divides his time among 
several jobs none of which he learns to do really well." Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 
12, at 250. 
101. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency 
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1297, 1389 (1986) ("A 
legal generalist brings to the bench a greater ability to analogize to other areas of the law, 
to find solutions in those areas, and to approach specific problems with fewer 
preconceptions."); Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. 
Rev. 1755, 1767-68 (1997) (arguing that generalization provides greater accountability 
and greater insight in seeing common threads across areas of law). 
102. Judge Posner articulates this concern by imagining an antitrust appellate court: 
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court might agree on some fundamental issues on which generalist 
judges would disagree, not necessarily because the specialists are right, 
but because membership on a specialized court might make a judge 
more likely to believe that the legal regime being overseen is thus particu-
larly important to protect and strengthen.103 This tendency may be ac-
centuated by the influence of interest groups on the appointments 
process. 104 
Antitrust theorists notoriously are divided over the goals of antitrust law-over 
whether that law is designed and should be interpreted to promote social or 
political values having to do with decentralizing economic power and equalizing 
the distribution of wealth or whether the law should merely foster the efficient 
allocation of resources .... A "camp" is more likely to gain the upper hand in a 
specialized court than in the entire federal court system or even in one circuit. 
Not only would most appointments to a specialized antitrust court be made from 
the camps; but experts are more sensitive to swings in professional opinion than 
an outsider, a generalist, would be. The appearance of uniform policy that would 
result from domination of the specialized court by one of the contending factions 
in antitrust policy would be an illusion; a turn of the political wheel would bring 
another of the warring camps into temporary ascendancy. 
Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 251. This argument is subject to at least two 
potential counterarguments. First, if there are policy cleavages, it may be preferable to 
have them resolved consistently than to have one panel resolve them one way and another 
panel resolve them another way, when presented with two separate legal issues that both 
depend ultimately on the same deep question. But see Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving 
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 20-21 (1996) (arguing for undertheorizedjudicial 
decisionmaking). Second, even if changes in such a court's composition mean that any 
uniformity achieved is temporary, even temporary uniformity may be useful. If uniformity 
is important because it makes decisions predictable, then revolution may be preferable to 
evolution. Sudden, abrupt changes in policy can still leave the law quite predictable, 
except for cases already in progress at the time of the transition. Cf. Nicholas L. 
Georgakopoulos, Predictability and Legal Evolution, 17 Int'! Rev. L. & Econ. 475, 475-76 
( 1997) (discussing the effects of common law and civil law decisionmaking on 
predictability). 
103. The example Judge Posner offers is of the Federal Circuit. Even before its 
creation, there was a "deep cleavage ... between those who believed that patent protection 
should be construed generously to create additional incentives to technological innovation 
and those who believed that patent protection should be narrowly construed to promote 
competition." Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 252. Someone who sits on a 
patent court might be more likely than a generalist judge to think patent protection is 
important and thus to interpret it expansively. 
104. Judge Posner explains: 
[A] specialized court can be controlled by the executive and legislative branches 
of government more effectively than a generalist court. It is easier to predict how 
judges will decide cases in their specialty than how they will decide cases across 
the board. If courts are specialized, therefore, the officials who appoint judges 
will be better able to use the appointments process to shape the court .... 
Id. at 254. "The specialist," Judge Posner concludes, "is likely to be more faithful to the 
current goals of a program than the generalist because he is more effectively screened for 
his sympathy for those goals and is in any event more likely to identify with them." Id. at 
256. 
1626 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1600 
Review by the Supreme Court partially alleviates both of these con-
cems, 105 but the Court's inability to hear more than occasional appeals 
from specialized courts106 means that its role in guiding specialized ap-
pellate courts is necessarily limited.107 If generalist review of specialized 
courts is in fact desirable, then using generalist judges to conduct special-
ized courts' en bane proceedings would help substantially. En bane 
panels easily could hear enough cases that specialized courts would not 
be able simply to ignore the prospect of generalist review. Specialized 
court panels, in tum, might try to adopt a generalist perspective even 
when not directly constrained by en bane precedent, for fear of frequent 
reversals. With generalist review of specialized courts, bare specialized 
circuit majorities will not necessarily be able to elevate their ideological 
preferences to circuit law, and circuits as a whole will find it difficult to 
embrace views that generalist judges would reject. 
C. Possibl,e Extensions 
The proposal that I have developed would change the en bane pro-
cess in only one way, albeit in a significant way. Like the other proposals 
to reform decisionmaking in the courts of appeals discussed in Part I, this 
proposal is incomplete, as no reform could lead to the "correct" decision 
being made in every case. No combination of reforms can achieve this 
either, but it is useful to consider what other changes might complement 
the proposal I have offered. Each of the following proposals is, like the 
principal proposal, designed to increase the probability that any given 
decision by a threejudge panel or an en bane panel is consistent with 
what a majority of all appellate judges would do. One might reject these 
105. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (overruling a unanimous 
Federal Circuit en bane opinion that held that the Federal Circuit could review the Patent 
and Trademark Office using a standard less deferential than that supplied by the 
Administrative Procedure Act); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 383 
(1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that Customs Service 
regulations were not subject to Chevron deference). My point is not that the Supreme 
Court is necessarily correct, but that its decisions often moderate the biases that specialized 
courts are perceived to have, and that the Supreme Court is likely to place more weight on 
generally applicable legal authorities. 
106. As of this writing, the Supreme Court has reviewed 28 Federal Circuit cases on 
the merits, reversing in 15, vacating in 3, and affirming in 10. Search ofWESTLAW, SCT 
database (Sept. 5, 2000) (figures derived from search for cases containing "Federal Circuit" 
in synopsis and identifying relevance and disposition of each). 
107. The D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia once argued, has effectively disobeyed the 
Supreme Court by construing Supreme Court administrative law cases narrowly. See 
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 359-66. Such disobedience, of course, is not overt, as the D.C. 
Circuit always has purported to be following the Supreme Court's decisions. But narrow 
interpretations can last a long time when a reviewing court will consider a particular issue 
only once in a number of years, and even once the Court does reject a line of authority, 
that case too may be read narrowly. 
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changes and still embrace my central proposal, but I believe that they 
would be salutary additions to it. 
1. R.andom Review. - One change would be to have some panel deci-
sions reviewed at random. The central proposal by itself would lead to 
more en bane review only if, as I think is probable,judges would be more 
likely to question decisions as outside reviewers than as reviewers of their 
immediate colleagues.108 In my view, though, it would be worthwhile to 
divert additional judicial resources to en bane review through random 
selection of additional cases to hear. 109 This is a pragmatic judgment 
about scarcity, informed only by my sense that the existing rate of en 
bane review is so low that the marginal gains in disciplining panel deci-
sionmaking by adding more cases would be high. 
The justification for random selection of some cases, whether or not 
the total en bane docket is increased, is that there are many cases in 
which the chance of en bane review,11° let alone review by the Supreme 
Court, 111 is effectively zero, regardless of which side the panel takes. 
Many of these cases, of course, will be easy, and en bane panels would 
likely dispose of them without oral argument or even significant discus-
sion. Overall, the costs of such review will surely exceed the benefits of 
improved justice in any particular case. This analysis overlooks, however, 
the benefits of establishing a principle that any decision might be re-
viewed. Such a principle might lead judges to take more care with rou-
tine cases, since it would be embarrassing to be reversed on one, particu-
larly if the panel's treatment of the issues was cursory. More significantly, 
it would provide at least a partial answer to those who complain that the 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 (stressing that the proposal would not 
necessarily lead to more en bane review) 
109. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for 
Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 805, 819-29 (1993) 
(enumerating benefits of en bane review). 
110. Some en bane cases do involve surprisingly esoteric issues. Tracey George, for 
example, cites the "unremarkable" contract interpretation case of Hardester v. Lincoln 
National Life Insurance Co., 52 F.3d 70 (4th Cir. 1995) (en bane), which held that breast 
cancer is not a "pre-existing" condition within the meaning of a group health insurance 
plan. George, Dynamics and Determinants, supra note 93, at 215. Surely, though, there 
are many run-of-the-mill cases involving subject matter for which the chance of en bane 
review is vanishingly small. Some ERISA cases or admiralty issues may be sufficiently 
controversial that they could be the subject of en bane review, but some cases, like those 
involving the interpretation of a federal regulation that has never been cited before and 
may never be cited again, are not. Some such cases could be difficult, in the sense that 
different panels might reach different results, but not important enough to the future 
development of the law that they would be viable candidates for en bane review as 
currently practiced, regardless of the correctness of the panel holding. 
111. The Supreme Court may be more willing than en bane panels to review decisions 
that were originally unpublished or summary. Usually, this occurs when a panel follows 
binding circuit precedent conflicting with that of another circuit. See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 
120 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000) (reviewing unpublished Fifth Circuit opinions at odds with 
those of other circuits). 
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courts of appeals resolve many cases with virtually no consideration,112 
and it would assure litigants that threejudge panels do not have unfet-
tered power. In my view, this would even merit reducing the number of 
cases selected by judges for en bane review (for example, by increasing 
the number of votes required to hear a case en bane), if such a tradeoff 
were necessary. 
An interesting variant on this proposed extension would be to select 
some cases for review before opinions are published and to withhold 
these opinions from the en bane panel. Once the en bane court ruled, 
the earlier opinion could be released. This approach would make it pos-
sible to determine how often a panel would reach the same result as a 
larger, en bane panel that presumably would devote more collective time 
and care to considering the question. The answer to this question might 
have implications for future possible reforms to en bane review. If the 
courts almost always reach the same answer independently, then perhaps 
en bane review is generally not all that important, 113 while if there were 
frequent disagreements, this might suggest that more extensive review 
would be desirable. I suspect that some will find such experimentation 
distasteful, 114 but it would be academically useful and cause little if any 
harm. 
2. Blind Review. - Another plausible modification is to keep the 
identities of the judges selected for an en bane panel secret, at least until 
cases are actually selected for argument. After parties filed suggestions 
for en bane review, the judges to constitute the. visiting en bane panel 
would be permitted to exchange anonymous correspondence concerning 
whether a particular case is en banc-worthy.115 Judges would then vote 
on whether cases should be heard, and only after these votes were submit-
ted would the names of the judges selected be revealed. On occasion, 
112. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 17, at 760 (arguing that appeals courts currently 
overvalue efficiency concerns). 
113. Of course, it could also be that they reach the same answer because judges on 
panels recognize that their decisions might be reviewed en bane. 
114. Perhaps some would argue that this is inappropriate unless litigants give 
"informed consent." But this type of experimentation is not akin to attempting an 
unproven surgical procedure. A decision by an en bane panel is not an untested legal 
procedure. Cf. Frank W.S.M. Verheggen & Frans C.B. van Wijmen, Myth and Reality of 
Informed Consent in Clinical Trials, 16 Med. & L. 53, 64-65 (1997) (arguing that 
informed consent requirements in medical contexts should be stricter where experimental 
procedures are involved). 
115. Judges could communicate about cases for which review was requested via an 
internet forum. Judges could be assigned usernames like "Judgel," 'Judge2," and so on. 
An interesting question is whether outsiders should have access to such forums. The 
argument that judges might shy away from candor were they to the public spotlight 
would not be as strong if communications were anonymous. Cf. Benjamin S. Duval, Jr., 
The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 579, 669 (1986) (suggesting that the desire to 
encourage "a candid interchange of information and views" explains the secrecy of judicial 
deliberation). Allowing public participation would turn the exchange of memoranda into 
a virtual extended oral argument. 
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judges might be able to guess the author of correspondence or might 
hear in casual conversation that another colleague is scheduled for a par-
ticular en bane, but a presumption of secrecy would prevent judges from 
knowing the entire composition of the en bane panel when deciding 
whether to accept cases. 
The advantage of this system is that it would prevent judges from 
voting to hear cases en bane simply because they believe that they would 
have the votes to achieve a particular result. Though en bane panels are 
likely to be more representative than individual circuits because they are 
randomly selected, 116 an individual en bane panel might still be unrepre-
sentative. A judge familiar with the views of colleagues nationwide might 
calculate whether to recommend en bane review on the basis of a pre-
dicted vote count. The en bane court's docket might counterproduc-
tively include cases specifically because the en bane panel is likely to 
adopt a position different from the majority one. This may happen al-
ready with en bane review, but blind review is not possible within the 
current en bane system, since everyone knows who will sit on an en bane 
case. Adoption of my central proposal might make it possible to change 
this. 
3. Representative Review. - It might be possible to achieve even more 
representativeness by applying some version of Tiller and Cross's propo-
sal to en bane decisionmaking.117 For example, en bane panels might be 
picked in such a way that the balance of Republicans and Democrats is as 
close as possible to their representation in the appellate judiciary as a 
whole. us The argument for forcing balance is both weaker and stronger 
in the en bane context. It is weaker in that there is less of a need for a 
"whistleblower";l19 the relatively large size of the en bane court and the 
prominence of en bane decisions make it more likely that significant 
counterarguments to a majority's position will be raised. It is stronger, 
though, in that it is easier to achieve representativeness by political prox-
ies in an elevenjudge court than in a three-judge panel. A panel with six 
judges from one party and five from the other is likely to have individuals 
with strong feelings on both sides of a controversial issue, as well as 
moderates whose votes will ultimately be the deciding ones.120 
116. But see infra Part 11.C.3 (suggesting that en bane panels be selected so that they 
are politically representative). 
117. See supra Part l.B.2. 
118. Alternatively, and perhaps somewhat more controversially, they might be picked 
in such a way as to approximate the representation of Democrats and Republicans in the 
electorate or in Congress. This might, however, strengthen arguments that forcing 
representative panels is unconstitutional. See Wald, supra note 63, at 256-60 (offering 
separation of powers and due process arguments to that effect). 
119. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing the thesis that having 
a whistle blower on a panel makes it more difficult for the majority to ignore the law). 
120. This seems much less likely in an en bane panel consisting, for example, of three 
judges of one party and eight of another. If the judiciary as a whole consists 55% of 
members of one party and 45% members of the other, the probability of randomly 
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III. THE NORMATIVE CAsE FOR MAJORITARIAN DECISIONMAKING 
My proposal is driven by the desire to ensure, as much as possible, 
that courts of appeals decisions will reflect what a majority of all judges 
would do. So far, though, I have simply assumed that majoritarianism is 
desirable. Though a full philosophical defense may be beyond the scope 
of this Essay, in this Part, I offer an affirmative case for majoritarian deci-
sionmaking and then consider various counterarguments to the proposal 
suggested in Part II. Each of these counterarguments suggests that even 
if majoritarian decisionmaking is desirable in theory, there might be 
some practical benefit to having a circuit's law reflect a minority position. 
A Presenting the Affirmative Case 
A standard realist attack on any attempt to improve legal decision-
making is that there is no such thing as a "right" or "wrong" answer to 
many legal problems, 121 and I do not disagree. But this objection should 
not lead us to conclude that any answer is just as good as any other. 
There is a reason that when one judge differs from the other two mem-
bers of a threejudge panel, the one judge's decision is a mere dissent 
while the majority's decision becomes the law, and it is not just a matter 
of convention.122 For the same reason that any individual person is more 
likely to be "right" than "wrong" in picking between two possible answers 
to a particular problem, 123 the majority of a collective decisionmaking 
drawing an eleven-judge court with eight or more judges from one political party is 25%. 
(There is a 19% chance of drawing eight or more judges from the majority party, and a 6% 
chance of drawing eight or more judges from the minority party.) This is a substantial 
enough percentage that Tiller and Cross's reform might be worthwhile. 
121. Or, at the least, we behave as if decisionmaking is not entirely futile, instead of 
responding to the possibility of radical skepticism by not deciding at all. "Even if 
convinced that there are no reasons for believing or doing anything, we still must decide 
how to live our lives; we still must decide how to act. These decisions are generated by 
information obtained from an individual's inner and outer environments." Robert Justin 
Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide 
Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 811, 823 (1990). 
122. Cf. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, 1 Mich. J. Race & L. 
195, 259 (1996) (acknowledging that "nobody would dare to propose as democratic a 
system where minorities rule over majorities"). There are other possible solutions, such as 
awarding two-thirds damages when one judge recommends awarding no damages at all. 
See generally Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 
Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2001) (discussing the possibility of responding to 
uncertainty with compromise verdicts of partial damages). 
123. If we do not accept this premise, then the entire enterprise of judging is 
essentially a waste of time, and legal scholarship even more so. It is possible (though 
unlikely) that the only disputes that actually are heard by judges are the most difficult 
ones, so that any particular judge is no more likely to arrive at a correct answer than an 
incorrect one on a particular problem. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984) (arguing that suits that are 
litigated may not be representative). Even if this were true, the legal system should 
probably still assume that the judge's answer is more likely to be correct than incorrect, to 
ensure that the easy cases are still resolved correctly in settlements. 
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body is more likely to have picked the better answer than the worse one. 
The pervasiveness of disagreement in law makes majoritarianism no less 
important, as long as we believe that legal decisionmaking is not entirely 
futile. Indeed, disagreement may make majoritarianism even more im-
portant, for it suggests that legal decisions may not be so different from 
legislative decisions after all. If some judicial decisions reduce to a choice 
between competing values, then it is important that this choice not be the 
preference of just one individual. The preference of a majority of judges 
might not be the same as that of a majority of the people, but the same is 
true of legislative decisionmaking. The best that can be achieved is for a 
decision to be the choice that a majority of those designated to make the 
choice would pick. 
Those who remain unpersuaded that majoritarianism in legal deci-
sionmaking is desirable should ask whether they would support a legal 
system that worked as follows: After each member of a threejudge panel 
wrote an opinion or signed onto another judge's opinion, a computer 
would randomly pick one of the judges.124 That judge's opinion would 
then control the outcome of the case and become binding precedent, 
even if the other two members of the panel disagreed with that judge's 
view. This would be a functional legal system, but it would place less 
value than the existing system on ensuring that a particular legal system is 
majoritarian.125 If this system seems foolish, it must be because the mere 
124. Jeremy Waldron has noted the possibility of using a randomization procedure to 
resolve disagreement, but has rejected it on the ground that such a procedure denies the 
equality of each judge's vote. See Jeremy Waldron, Deliberation, Disagreement, and 
Voting, in Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights 210, 223 (Harold Hongju Koh & 
Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999): 
We could, for example, toss a coin when the justices disagree. But such a 
procedure would be objectionable precisely because it did not take the fact that at 
least one justice was in favor of a given decision as a reason for going with that 
decision rather than the alternative. 
Waldron also provides the following useful demonstration that majoritarianism is in fact a 
value in judicial decisionmaking: 
Is it in fact our practice to abandon the principle of majority rule when an issue is 
shifted from popular or representative decision-making to the courts? The 
answer is clearly no. The principle of majority rule remains as the fundamental 
basis for settling disagreement about the merits of an issue among the members 
of a given court. ... The difference, when an issue is shifted from legislature to 
court or from referendum to court, is a difference of constituency, not a 
difference of decision method. We stick with the principle of majority rule; only 
now it is applied to a decision-making body of nine individuals, rather than a 
body of hundreds (in the case of a legislature) or millions (in the case of a 
popular initiative). 
Id. at 215. 
125. Those who would endorse this change should ask whether they would embrace 
also a system in which the computer randomly picked with equal probability either the 
dissenting opinion or the opinion endorsed by two judges. If even this seems attractive, 
they should ask whether they would endorse a system that automatically would result in the 
adoption of the dissenting opinion (assuming there were some way of ensuring that judges 
did not game the system by voting against their true views). The true skeptic of the value 
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fact that two judges supported one position and just one judge supported 
the other makes the former position seem more attractive. But this is an 
appeal to the value of majoritarianism. 
The "majority rules" approach to resolving disagreement among 
judges is thus a salutary and largely uncontroversial structural choice. 
That does not necessarily mean, however, that we have solved the prob-
lem of judicial structure. The majority of one panel, after all, might 
reach a different result than a majority of another, especially on difficult 
questions. 126 The practical problem is that it is infeasible for all U.S. 
courts of appeals judges to hear every case. Hence, the collective dele-
gates decisionmaking to small numbers of judges who may have minority 
positions on particular issues. 127 Larger panels, however, are more likely 
to decide cases as the majority would resolve them. 128 This is the simple 
logic of Condorcet's famous Jury Theorem,129 and if it makes sense for 
of majoritarian decisionmaking should at least be indifferent toward the adoption of these 
systems. 
126. Madison worried about a similar challenge in the design of legislative 
institutions: "[T]he smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the 
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and 
execute their plans of oppression." The Federalist No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). Judicial independence may make "oppression" less of a concern, but 
the danger that a majority of three judges will be able to effect a result that a majority of 
the broader body would reject is analogous. 
127. Tracey George usefully places panels in a principal-agency framework: 
Organization theory applied to the relationship between the en bane court and 
the three-judge panels begins with the premise that the court and panels have 
entered into an implicit but incomplete agency agreement (known as a 
"relational contract"). The principal-agent construct situates the circuit court as 
the principal authorizing the panel as agent to act on its behalf. The circuit 
bench delegates the resolution of some cases to a given panel. The panel has 
limited discretion to resolve the disputes assigned to it. 
George, Dynamics and Determinants, supra note 93, at 245. George, however, does not 
consider that an individual circuit's en bane court itself might be considered the agent of 
the courts of appeals. 
128. Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager make this point well in arguing that 
larger panels are more likely to reach the correct result than smaller ones: 
[W]e may consider each judge's decision as the draw of a single marble from a 
bag with marbles of two colors (white for a correct decision, blue for an incorrect 
decision), mixed in proportion to the likelihood of any judge's choosing the 
correct outcome. Adding judges simply adds draws (with replacement); as long 
as the proportion of white marbles in the bag exceeds 1/2, the more draws there 
are, the more likely it becomes that more than half of the marbles drawn will be 
colored white or "correct." The fact that there are more judges on a panel thus 
implies that the panel is more accurate, i.e., more likely to reach the correct 
decision. 
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 87, at 97-98. 
129. For discussions of the theorem, see Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates, 
and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in 
Information Pooling and Group Decision Making 173, 175-77 (Bernard Grofman & 
Guillermo Owen eds., 1986); Bernard Grofman, Judgmental Competence of Individuals 
and Groups in a Dichotomous Choice Situation: Is a Majority of Heads Better Than One?, 
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juries, it makes sense for judges too. The point can be seen most clearly 
by considering extremes. If all judges on the courts of appeals consider a 
particular case, then the resulting majority decision will by definition be 
that of the majority of all judges, but if just one judge is selected to re-
solve that case, the judge might not produce the same decision. 
A kneejerk response to this observation therefore would be to struc-
ture the courts of appeals explicitly like a legislature, with all judges vot-
ing on all cases. There are obvious problems with this approach. The 
rules that guide legislatures leave them free not to resolve contested is-
sues, but leaving cases undecided is not a feasible option for a judici-
ary.130 Even if it were possible to adopt voting rules that would force 
resolution of all cases, adjudication is not just about reaching correct out-
comes, but about providing reasons for decisions. 131 So it probably 
makes sense to have big legislatures and small courts.132 The norms of 
adjudication, moreover, make small courts less dangerous than small leg-
islatures, 133 preventing the out-and-out self-interest that we tolerate or en-
courage in legislatures.134 In addition, the existence of Supreme Court 
review may give judges considerable pause before they elevate their more 
idiosyncratic opinions into law. 
6]. Math. Soc. 47, 48-52 (1978); cf. Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and 
Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 Econometrica 680, 682 (1952) 
(proving that only majority rule conforms to four specified formal requirements). 
130. The courts can, of course, leave issues undecided. See generally Cass R Sunstein, 
The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Fmward: Leaving Things Undecided, llO Harv. L. Rev. 
4, 6-7 (1996). 
131. One reason for this is that giving reasons for actions entails some commitment to 
particular resolutions of future decisions, and such commitment may be more appropriate 
in adjudicative than in legislative bodies. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. 
L. Rev. 633, 656-59 (1995) (equating "giving reasons" with committing, which may be 
desirable). 
132. Jeremy Waldron has provided an excellent account of the justification for having 
large legislatures. See Jeremy Waldron, Legislation by Assembly 1-22 (2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Columbia Law Review). He explains: 
For all its black robes and leather-bound splendor, the character of the judicial 
process is not something one can credibly invoke as the basis for a respectful 
response to a good faith challenge to the morality of a legal decision. By contrast, 
an appeal to the procedures of a legislative assembly-with all the major views in 
the community actively represented by their most forceful advocates-is a 
respectful response to the challenge. 
Id. at 21. 
133. Cf. The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (arguing for long judicial terms because the judiciary is the weakest department). 
134. Whether we tolerate or encourage it depends on whether we adopt a republican 
or liberal perspective. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is 
It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1695, 1703-15 (1989) (comparing "the Republican 
Revival" to historical republicanism and contemporary liberalism); Morton ]. Horwitz, 
Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 57, 65-67 (1987) (describing republicanism as emanating "from an objective 
conception of the public interest" and liberalism as deriving from "individual self-
interest"). 
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Nonetheless, once we accept the existence of legitimate legal disa-
greement, we must also recognize that leaving many decisions to individ-
ual panels means that many issues will not be resolved in the same way a 
majority would decide them. In many cases, judges could probably rule 
for either party and produce an opinion highly likely to survive Supreme 
Court review. And so a panel may endorse a position that, though not 
absurd, would probably not command assent from a majority of all appel-
late judges. This may not pose an obstacle to democratic legitimacy, as 
any decisionmaking system will have imperfections. If, however, a struc-
tural change to the adjudicative process could produce more 
majoritarian decisionmaking, then it might be democratically preferable, 
assuming it does not sacrifice important elements of the judicial process. 
One of those important elements is the practice of dissent, which 
permits the articulation of minority opinions. Debate and dissent may be 
important in allowing the judiciary to correct errors and improve policy 
over time. Sometimes, the majority in hindsight will prove wrong, either 
famously, as in the case of historical atrocities like slavery, or because of 
simple errors in logic or perception on issues far more routine. If it were 
possible to predict these instances, then we could selectively discard ma-
joritarianism, but of course it isn't. Perhaps every real and armchair 
judge believes that he can predict the future tides of public opinion and 
jurisprudence, but there is no objective way in the present to identify the 
best prognosticator.135 Maintaining debate is important, but it does not 
require that minority views be selected at random for enshrinement into 
law. 
I use the word "minority" to refer to the outnumbered group on a 
particular issue, but I must acknowledge the other, related sense of the 
word. We may be particularly concerned with the welfare of certain mi-
nority groups, such as African-Americans, and with the prospect that fos-
tering majoritarian decisionmaking would lead, as Lani Guinier and 
others have feared, to a "tyranny of the majority."136 Guinier has inti-
mated that perhaps legal decisionmaking ought to work according to the 
principle intuitively embraced by her young son, that of "taking turns,"137 
and indeed this is what our existing system of appellate review achieves. 
Yet not even Guinier argues that decisionmaking responsibilities should 
be channeled to individual decisionmakers at random. 138 That, after all, 
135. Richard Primus has argued persuasively that vindicated dissents become the 
majority position solely because of events after the dissents are written, not because of 
anything in the dissents themselves. See Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and 
Judicial Dissent, 48 Duke LJ. 243, 247 (1998) ("The canonicity of a dissent is not a 
function of the dissent itself but of the later court or courts that redeem it and make it 
canonical."). 
136. Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in 
Representative Democracy 3 (1994). 
137. Id. at 1-5. 
138. Rather, she is concerned with ensuring that minority groups are able to receive 
adequate representation. See id. at 119-56. 
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could as easily lead to an advocate of limited government deciding a civil-
rights case as it could lead to someone with whom she would more likely 
agree deciding it. Perhaps a flaw of majoritarianism is that minorities 
with deeply felt preferences and beliefs may lose to a majority with weak 
preferences, and for this problem, my current proposal offers no logroll-
ing solution. But there is no reason to think that a minority group will 
benefit more from having one of its members decide every tenth case 
than it will from having every case decided according to the majority view, 
which, one should hope, would take the interests of the minority group 
into account. 
I must also acknowledge that I have used the words "majority" and 
"minority" in a limited sense, to refer to the members of a particular deci-
sionmaking body, the courts of appeals, rather than the members of soci-
ety at large, or even the entire federal judiciary. The majority of judges 
on the courts of appeals may have different views on some issues from the 
majority of members of the Supreme Court or the majority of members 
of Congress. Perhaps the Fourth Circuit is the better representative of 
the courts of appeals, and it would be a loss for the Fourth Circuit to have 
to move towards the others. Underlying this logic, however, is the recog-
nition that decisionmaking bodies may be imperfectly representative. 
But unrepresentativeness will be greater with smaller bodies than with 
larger ones, so a consistent policy of visiting en bane panels should be an 
overall improvement. Presumably, courts of appeals judges may factor 
the possibility of Supreme Court review or legislative reversal into their 
decisionmaking, but the question is still what decision to make given 
these review mechanisms. All I maintain is that the courts of appeals as a 
whole are a better baseline for providing an answer than any individual 
panel or circuit. 
The solution that I have proposed, of course, can only take us one 
small step toward the hypothetical ideal world in which judges resolved 
all cases as the majority would resolve them. My purpose, though, is not 
simply to provide incentives in a narrowly economic sense, but to incul-
cate a norm that judges should seek to decide cases as most judges would 
decide them. 139 In our judicial culture, an identification of a jurist as a 
"liberal judge" or a "conservative judge" is not necessarily an epithet. My 
premise is that we would be better off if judges approached cases by ask-
ing themselves how a majority of their fellows, given full information and 
adequate time for reflection, would resolve them. Differently stated, 
judges ought not act as voters pointing to the arguments that they person-
ally find most persuasive, but as statesmen assessing which arguments 
139. In the terminology of Cass Sunstein, I am acting as a "norm entrepreneur," both 
by maintaining that judicial moderation should be seen as an ideal and by suggesting an 
institutional change that might inculcate this norm. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets 
and Social Justice 48 ( 1997). 
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would be appealing to judges generally. 140 Perhaps enacting a structural 
reform that would give judges practical incentives to place their own per-
spectives aside ultimately would bring about a beneficial shift in judges' 
views of their roles. 
B. Addressing Counterar{SUments 
1. Regionalism. - In discussing proposals to split and divide circuits, 
I noted that an ostensible goal of such proposals is to promote consis-
tency, 141 a goal that the partial homogenization of the law through visit-
ing en bane panels would help achieve. Perhaps the real goal of propos-
als to split and divide circuits, however, is not to achieve consistency 
across the circuit at all. Indeed, it might be the reverse, to allow different 
law for different regions. The Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals suggested that "the divisional structure re-
spects and heightens the regional character deemed a desirable feature 
of the federal intermediate appellate system."142 More directly stated, 
courts covering relatively small, homogeneous areas are likely to be more 
ideologically compatible with the residents of those areas than are courts 
with jurisdiction over larger areas. Though the Commission mostly skirts 
the issue, 143 concerns about ideological compatibility between area and 
judiciary helped drive proposals to split the Ninth Circuit. 144 
The desire to have inconsistent interdivisional or intercircuit law that 
respects regional variability at first seems entirely consistent with the fed-
eral system. After all, one justification for having fifty states, not to men-
tion countless municipalities, is that this structure allows for the law to 
vary from place to place in accordance with the differing political views 
140. I use the term "statesmen" to allude to Anthony T. Kronman's defense of the 
lawyer-statesman. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal 
Profession 109 (1993). Kronman is skeptical of the promise of what he calls "scientific Jaw 
reform," see id. at 17-23, and therefore may be skeptical of proposals to tweak the judicial 
system. Nonetheless, he might applaud the proposal for having the indirect effect of 
promoting the lawyer-statesman ideal. The lawyer-statesman recognizes that political 
choices are often between incommensurate goods and therefore makes choices in order to 
maintain community cohesion. See id. at 88-93. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. 
142. Final Report, supra note 37, at 49. 
143. The Commission explicitly disavowed any intention to "restructure courts ... 
because of particular judicial decisions or particular judges," emphasizing that "decisions 
about judicial structure and circuit alignment should be based on objective and principled 
considerations of sound judicial administration." Id. at 6. The Commission also stated 
that it did not agree with the implication "that only judges from the region can get the law 
right." Id. at 52. This statement dichotomizes "right" and "wrong" decisions in a way that 
is seemingly inconsistent with the notion that what is right for one region (and to most 
judges in that region) might be wrong for another. 
144. See, e.g., Ken Miller, Lance: Idaho Should Change Courts, Idaho Statesman, 
Oct. 11, 1999, at IA (describing Idaho Attorney General's attempt to remove Idaho from 
Ninth Circuit). 
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and needs of the residents of the states.145 Perhaps more saliently, state 
supreme courts are permitted to adopt their own interpretations of state 
constitutional provisions, even where those provisions seem to track pro-
visions in the U.S. Constitution.146 Similarly, it might seem appropriate 
that where a federal statute (or the federal common law) is ambiguous, a 
more conservative region should receive a more conservative resolution 
of the ambiguity than a more liberal region. 147 
This perspective becomes much less attractive, however, once it is 
emphasized that it is federal law that is being interpreted. Suppose, for 
example, that Montana-based federal judges are more suspicious of the 
IRS in federal tax cases than are California-based federal judges. While it 
is appropriate for Montana to impose lower state taxes than California, it 
does not seem fair for Montana taxpayers to receive a more generous 
federal tax jurisprudence than California taxpayers. Federal law is differ-
ent in kind from local law:148 Much of federal law defines individuals' 
rights and responsibilities with respect to the federal government, or with 
respect to individuals who may be from other regions of the country. 
These are not issues for which the idiosyncratic preferences of residents 
or judges in a particular region should affect the outcome. 
The strength of the Commission's view is this: its versatility. Al-
though the decision of whether one division should follow the law of an-
other initially lies within that division, the Ninth Circuit as a whole, acting 
through the Circuit Division, ultimately may decide whether such incon-
sistency is desirable, tolerable, or unacceptable. This accommodation of 
the competing values of regional and national law is hardly ideal, how-
ever. The Circuit Division, after all, may be more representative of the 
Ninth Circuit than any division constructed within that Circuit, but it still 
is not national. Indeed, relative to the nation as a whole, the Ninth Cir-
145. As Larry Kramer argues, "The whole point of federalism (or at least the best 
reason to care about it) is that, because preferences for governmental policy are unevenly 
distributed among the states and regions of the nation, more people can be satisfied by 
decentralized decisionmaking." Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the 
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 222 (2000). 
146. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-44 (1983) (discussing scope of 
the "independent state ground" rule). 
147. I do not mean to imply that liberal-conservative is the only relevant axis along 
which regions may differ. Ideological differences may be regionally based in other ways as 
well. Perhaps, one might argue, more agrarian areas should be entitled to a jurisprudence 
that is friendlier to agrarian peoples, while urban areas might benefit from a different type 
of jurisprudence. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal 
Interpretation, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 785, 786 (1996) (offering a definition of "ideology" and 
implying that liberalism and conservatism are only two ideologies that judges might 
adopt). 
148. The line, of course, is blurry, but the Supreme Court's recent eagerness to police 
it means that there will be few issues of federal law in which no one outside of a particular 
region has a plausible interest in the resolution of the controversy. For a recent 
articulation of the local/national distinction, see United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 
1740, 1754 (2000), which reiterated that " [ t]he Constitution requires a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local." 
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cuit might well be as regional with respect to many legal issues as any 
division within it. 
What is needed is some way to ensure that, whatever happens to the 
Ninth Circuit, circuit law neither bears too much of a regional flavor 
when judges nationally would view such distinctiveness unfavorably, nor is 
forced to be consistent with a national policy when regionalization would 
be appropriate. My proposal achieves this: Ordinarily, visiting en bane 
panels would tend to decrease regional influences on decisionmaking. 
Judges, however, would be free not to hear a case, or to defer to the panel 
decision, 149 because they feel that the issue is one in which it is appropri-
ate for regional preferences to control and that the panel decision re-
flects such preferences. This might not happen often, but that is an argu-
ment against en bane decisionmaking only if circuit judges could be 
expected systematically to undervalue regional decisionmaking. 
2. Percolation. - A second argument against the proposal also de-
cries the homogenization of the law that visiting en bane panels might 
effect. This argument focuses not on accommodation of regional prefer-
ences, but on the benefits of having diverse approaches to legal issues 
nationwide. 15° For Supreme Court decisionmaking to be effective, the 
argument goes, issues must percolate in the lower federal courts.151 If 
149. This would be tantamount to a decision by the Supreme Court to dismiss a writ 
of certiorari as improvidently granted. See, e.g., New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 249 
(1984). 
150. See, e.g., Black, supra note 49, at 898 ("Many ... [conflicts] can be endured and 
sometimes perhaps ought to be endured while judges and scholars observe the respective 
workings out in practice of the conflicting rules .... "); see also Wallace, supra note 11, at 
928-32 (discussing pros and cons of intercircuit conflicts). This argument is different 
from that made by advocates of "competitive federalism." See generally Thomas R. Dye, 
American Federalism: Competition Among Governments 175-99 (1990) (describing 
competitive federalism as the expression of contrasting social values); William W. Bratton 
&Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary 
Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo. LJ. 201, 207-19 (1997) (analyzing the 
economic theory underlying federalism);Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does 
Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1521, 1530 (1997) (noting that competitive 
federalism analogizes political competition to private market competition); Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale 
LJ. 2359, 2365-72 (1998) (suggesting state and federal securities regulators should have 
equal authority, and companies should choose between them); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64]. Pol. Econ. 416, 419-20 (1956) (presenting the seminal 
analysis of competitive federalism). Competitive federalism is possible only where 
regulated entities can choose the jurisdiction that will regulate them. Having diverse 
circuit law, in most cases, would not produce a race to the top (or to the bottom), because 
there is no mechanism akin to natural selection to ensure that the stronger legal regimes 
survive. 
151. See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 51, at 699 ("[T]he mere existence ofa 
conflict does not warrant Supreme Court intervention unless the costs created by the 
conflict outweigh the beneficial effects of further percolation."); see also Maryland v. 
Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) ("It may be desirable to have 
different aspects of an issue further illumined by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has 
its own time for ripening."). But see Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme 
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every circuit develops the same solution to a problem, the Supreme Court 
will never receive the benefit of conflicting circuit decisions, and Su-
preme Court decisions may suffer as a result. If visiting en bane panels 
achieve uniformity only at the expense of the quality of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking, the price may be too high. 
The goal of my proposal, however, is not uniformity per se: The 
adoption of the proposal would not eliminate intercircuit conflicts. 
Rather, the goal is simply to have relatively large, objective, and represen-
tative groups decide some issues. Such groups might still disagree with 
one another on particularly close cases, and panel decisions that are not 
reviewed would still produce some conflicts. If the proposal is enacted, to 
be sure, the number of conflicts would be less. But the Supreme Court 
has plenty of conflicts from which to choose anyway. 152 My proposal 
would tend to steer the Court toward the most difficult legal questions, 
those on which moderates disagree, rather than those in which a very 
small number of judges dare to take an extremist position. For those who 
believe in judicial minimalism, this should be a positive development. 153 
Moreover, if the number of direct circuit conflicts did fall precip-
itously, the Supreme Court could change the criteria by which it selects 
cases to review. 154 A circuit split is only the most prominent basis for 
Supreme Court review on certiorari.155 If the justices felt after enactment 
of the proposal that the Supreme Court was no longer hearing a signifi-
cant number of cases for which Supreme Court review would be helpful, 
it could decide to hear cases presenting important issues of federal law 
about which the lower courts have expressed considerable disagreement, 
regardless of whether such disagreement was manifested in a direct legal 
conflict. For example, the Court might decide to consider a dispute in 
Court?, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 689 (1990) (asserting that "percolation exacts important 
and painful costs" but acknowledging its benefits); Justice William H. Rehnquist, The 
Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1986) ("[T]hat it is 
actually desirable to allow important questions of federal law to 'percolate' in the lower 
courts for a few years before the Supreme Court takes them on seems to me a very strange 
suggestion."); Todd]. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts 
Cases: Percolation or Procastination?, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 861, 882-91 (1993) (performing a 
study showing no demonstrable improvement in decisionmaking in Supreme Court cases 
in which there has been greater percolation in the lower federal courts). 
152. See Floyd Feeney, Conflicts Involving Federal Law: A Review of Cases Presented 
to the Supreme Court, in Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change app. B at 93, 106 
(1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 app. Bat 301, 318 (concluding that the Supreme Court 
fails to review about 60 conflicts annually). But see Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 51, at 
697-700 (disputing Feeney's analysis). 
153. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the 
Supreme Court 10-19 (1999) (arguing for "democracy-forcing minimalism"). 
154. Judge Weis gives much the same answer to a similar objection to his proposal to 
eliminate circuits altogether in favor of a single, national circuit. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., 
Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits-A Plug for a Unified Court of Appeals, 39 St. 
Louis U. LJ. 455, 471-72 (1995). 
155. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. 
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which three circuits had ruled the same way, but did so over dissents at-
tracting a large number of lower court judges. 
3. Experimentation. - If the purpose of percolation is simply to en-
sure that the Supreme Court has in hand arguments both for and against 
a particular position, then such a change in review rules would solve the 
problem. One might argue, however, that what the Court sometimes 
needs is the experience of different circuits living under different rules. 
For example, the justices might care about the workability of different 
solutions, and actual experience by those seeking to comply with rules of 
different circuits may be better than mere speculation. Such experimen-
tation also may be useful to Congress or even to state legislatures. 
If experimentation is really a significant concern, 156 though, it is one 
that en bane panels might explicitly support. An en bane panel might 
decide not to follow the rule of another circuit simply to create a con-
flict.157 The court might justify such a decision by noting that the context 
was one in which a natural experiment would be particularly useful. If it 
seems that this would not happen much, it is only because judges do not 
highly value such experiments. Perhaps judges undervalue experimenta-
tion, but attempts to persuade judges that such experimentation would 
be useful seem more likely to produce judicious use of this tool than a 
structural mechanism that automatically creates an experiment given dis-
agreement, even if the experiment is unlikely to produce useful data. 
CONCLUSION 
The transformation of the courts of appeals is not a sudden develop-
ment, and the days when Supreme Court justices rode circuit are irre-
trievably lost. Perhaps some of the mystique of the courts is gone too.158 
My aim has not been to turn back the clock, or even to resolve the ex-
isting debates about the future of the courts of appeals. Rather, I have 
tried to show that it might be possible to restore to them institutional 
156. I am skeptical that this is important to the Court. On occasion, the Court does 
conclude that a decision it previously rendered has turned out to be unworkable. See, e.g., 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (finding the doctrine 
of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), to be unworkable). I have been 
unable, however, to find a case in which the Court has explicitly compared the workability 
or desirability of different lower court approaches to an issue by examining those courts' 
experiences with the issue. 
157. This would flip the common practice by which a circuit shows some deference to 
the judgment of a sister circuit. See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 
1979) (explaining that such deference is in the interest of intercircuit uniformity). A 
circuit adopting a position specifically to create a conflict would effectively be following a 
principle of antideference. 
158. This may not be lamentable. See Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 1, 3 (1998) (suggesting that "professional mystique" may be a means by which a 
profession with shaky claims to superior knowledge seeks to secure its societal position); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, It's Good to Put a Human Face on a God-Like Role, L.A. Times, Nov. 
16, 1994, at B7 (arguing that it is important to recognize the fallibility of judges). 
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coherence, regardless of whether Congress adds judgeships or how Con-
gress reconfigures circuits. The challenge, in my view, is not simply to 
find an optimal hierarchy of review, or to figure out how to divide or 
consolidate circuits. It is to temper the disconnect between any given 
decision and the courts as a whole. By making the identity of reviewing 
judges unpredictable, visiting en banes would help accomplish this and, 
ironically, improve the predictability of the law itself. 
The proposal, moreover, seems sufficiently modest to be politically 
palatable. By stressing the virtue of moderation, the proposal may be at-
tractive both to conservatives eager to police the Ninth Circuit and liber-
als eager to rein in the Fourth. I suspect, however, that there is one sig-
nificant group that will not like the proposal: federal judges. Enactment 
of visiting en bane panels would result in more intensive review of their 
work, not to mention more travel. More significantly, while academics 
have been unconcerned about ensuring democratically defensible judi-
cial lawmaking, judges may be even less troubled by the prospect that 
outcomes may depend in part on panel selection.159 And so, the propo-
sal ironically might seem to fail its own test: approval by a majority of 
federal appellate judges.160 My immediate goal, however, is not to 
achieve swift enactment of the proposal, but to challenge the academy's 
indifference to the goal of achieving majoritarian judicial 
decisionmaking. 
159. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 22, at 619-20 (defending the predictability of 
judicial outcomes based on panel composition); Newman, supra note 85, at 382-85 
(defending the rarity of en bane decisionmaking in the Second Circuit); Wald, supra note 
63, at 251-53 (implying that judges' backgrounds impact outcomes). Reform proposals 
that judges have offered would not lead to routine scrutiny of judicial work. See generally 
Wallace, supra note 11, at 936-37 (proposing a national en bane court); Weis, supra note 
154, at 466 (proposing consolidation of all circuits). 
160. Of course, my proposal does not attempt to supplant legislative decisionmaking 
with decisionmaking by the hypothetical median judge, but simply to ensure majoritarian 
decisionmaking on legal questions as to which the legislature has not directly spoken, as 
well as majoritarian assessments of whether the legislature has spoken. A legislature 
therefore might legitimately enact judicial reforms over judicial opposition, although 
federal judges may represent a powerful interest group that makes such reform unlikely. 
See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 924, 949-55 (2000) (arguing that the federal judiciary has 
functioned as a powerful interest group). 
